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AN ESSAY ON IMMIGRATION POLITICS, POPULAR
DEMOCRACY, AND CALIFORNIA'S PROPOSITION 187:
THE POLITICAL RELEVANCE AND LEGAL
IRRELEVANCE OF RACE
Kevin R. Johnson*
In elegantly referring to "government of the people, by the people, and
for the people,"' Abraham Lincoln famously tapped into the nation's
enthusiasm for democracy. From the founding of this nation, however,
the potential excesses of democracy also have generated considerable
concern.2 In an attempt to avoid such excesses, the Constitution
moderates popular sentiment through a representative form of
government.3
An odd combination of devotion to and ambivalence about democracy
carries forward to this day. The debates over civic republicanism, for
example, reflect differing visions about the benefits of a more democratic
government. Some applaud an expanded role for "the people" in
governance while others express fear about how the majority might treat
the minority.4 Similarly, conflicting views about trial by jury typify the
sharp disagreements about democracy in action. While juries are often
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1. Gettysburg Address (Nov. 19, 1863), reproduced in Garry Wills, Lincoln at Gettysburg 261
(1992) (analyzing intellectual foundations for Lincoln's famous speech).
2. See Thomas E. Cronin, Direct Democracy: The Politics of Initiative, Referendum, and Recall 7
(1989) ("Americans of the Revolutionary era were profoundly ambivalent about democracy.");
Terrance Sandalow, Judicial Protection of Minorities, 75 Mich. L. Rev. 1162, 1164 (1977) ("The
concern that democratic government will provide inadequate protection for minorities is as old as the
nation-perhaps as old as the idea of democracy itself.").
3. See infra text accompanying notes 61-74 (analyzing framers' concerns with direct democracy).
4. Compare Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, 97 Yale L.J. 1539 (1988) (arguing
that liberal republican ideas suggest need for reform of a number of areas of public law) with Derrick
Bell & Preeta Bansal, The Republican Revival and Racial Politics, 97 Yale L.J. 1609 (1988)
(expressing skepticism about what Republican revival has to offer people of color).
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revered as a bastion of democracy,' judges have a myriad of devices at
their disposal that allow them to override perceived jury excesses.6
The popular initiative process, which takes a variety of forms in the
various states,7 reflects the nation's ambivalence about democratic rule.'
Generally, legislative bodies, such as Congress and state legislatures,
composed of elected representatives make the law. The initiative process,
as an exception to that general rule, affords voters themselves the
opportunity to directly enact laws. The initiative, consistent with its
Progressive era roots,9 often is regaled as a populist tool that may force
5. See, e.g., Thiel v. Southern Pac. Co., 328 U.S. 217, 220 (1946) (lauding "democratic ideals of
trial by jury"); Alexis De Tocqueville, Democracy in America 293-94 (Vintage ed. 1945) (making
similar observations about trial by jury in United States). But see Warren H,. Burger, Thinking the
Unthinkable, 31 Loy. L. Rev. 205 (1985) (offering reasons why trial by jury is dysfunctional); Julius
Paul, Jerome Frank's Views on Trial by Jury, 22 Mo. L. Rev. 28 (1957) (suramarizing Frank's deep
reservations about trial by jury).
6. See, e.g., Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(a)-(b) (providing for judgment as a matter of law that allows court
to take case away from jury); Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 (providing for summary judgment so that case can
be taken from jury); Fed. R. Civ. P. 59 (allowing judge to grant new trial after jury has returned
verdict).
The jury verdict acquitting police officers of state criminal charges in the beating of Rodney King,
which triggered civil unrest in Los Angeles in 1992, is a well-publicized example of so-called jury
excesses. See Kimberl6 Crenshaw & Gary Peller, Reel Time/Real Justice, 7C Deny. U. L. Rev. 283,
286 (1993) (noting that most explanations of verdict in Rodney King case "center around the image
of jury lawlessness-the idea that the jury's result was corrupted because they ignored the clear
evidence of brutality to acquit the police"). For concrete reforms designed to reinvigorate public
confidence in the jury system, see Akhil Reed Amar, Reinventing Juries: Ten Suggested Reforms, 28
U.C. Davis L. Rev. (forthcoming 1995).
7. See Philip Dubois & Floyd Feeney, Laimmaking by Initiative: Issues, Options and Comparisons
oh. 4 (forthcoming 1995) (offering comparative analysis of initiative process in states). Among other
worthwhile studies of the intricacies of the initiative process are Cronin, supra note 2 and David B.
Magleby, Direct Legislation: Voting on Ballot Propositions in the United States (1984).
8. See Lawrence G. Sager, Insular Majorities Unabated: Warth v. Seldin and City of Eastlake v.
Forest City Enterprises, Inc., 91 Harv. L. Rev. 1373, 1403 (1978) (observing "sharp clash of
constitutional values" implicated by legislation through initiative and referendum).
9. Professor Richard Briffault nicely summarizes the roots of the initiative process in the United
States:
Voter initiated legislation---"the initiative" is a product of the tum-of-th,.e-century Progressive
movement. The Progressives believed that party bosses, political machines, and special interests
had seduced representative institutions away from serving the public inte-rest. Late nineteenth
century politics, like the marketplace of that era, was believed to be in the grip of powerful and
rapacious combinations. Much as antitrust law was designed to break the economic power of
these combinations and restore free competition, the initiative, with the allied reforms of the
direct primary, the popular election of Senators, the referendum, and the recall, was intended to
break the stranglehold these combinations had on the political process by bringing the people
directly into lawmaking. "The people" would act only on behalf of the public as a whole, not to
advance selfish, private interests. Moreover, Progressives thought that direct democracy would
improve the people as well as their government. Through involvement in government, people
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change on a government captured by special interests."0 In this spirit,
initiatives have furthered a number of laudable goals in some states,
including eliminating the poll tax and extending the franchise to
women."1
On the other hand, some initiatives, and at times the initiative process,
have been less praiseworthy.'2 Voters, for example, have enacted laws
that have violated the Constitution by impinging on individual rights. 3
Some initiatives, even though they survived constitutional challenges,
have been thinly veiled attempts to exclude outsiders from the
community because of their race or class.'4 The initiative process in
could learn about important issues; they would discuss and debate them with each other, they
would develop civic virtue.
Richard Briffault, Distrust of Democracy, 63 Tex. L. Rev. 1347, 1348 (1985) (book review)
(footnotes omitted); see Benjamin Parke DeWitt, The Progressive Movement 213-43 (1915)
(articulating Progressive arguments for initiative, referendum, and recall); Dubois & Feeney, supra
note 7, chs. 2-3 (describing history of initiative and analyzing how it fits into American democracy).
10. See, eg., City of Eastlake v. Forest City Enter., Inc., 426 U.S. 668, 673 (1976) ("The
referendum... is a means for direct political participation, allowing the people the final decision,
amounting to a veto power, over enactments of representative bodies. The practice is designed to
'give citizens a voice on questions of public policy.") (citation omitted); see also V.0. Key, Jr. &
Winston W. Crouch, The Initiative and the Referendum in California 423 (1939) (discussing efforts
of Progressives to institute initiative process and stating that "[its fundamental aspect was a
profound attachment to the principles of democracy").
11. See Cronin, supra note 2, at 50-52,59, 97-98, 199.
12. See Dubois & Feeney, supra note 7, at 1 (recognizing that, while some view initiative as the
"very essence of democracy," others are "appalled by the demagoguery and simple-minded
campaigns that characterize many initiative elections"). Compare James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137,
141 (1971) (Black, J.) ("Provisions for referendums demonstrate devotion to democracy .... ') with
Wallace v. Zinman, 254 P. 946, 949 (Cal. 1927) ("It is common knowledge that an initiative measure
is originated by some organization or a small group of people.., that the measure is then placed up
on the ballot and a large number of the population, not knowing what the context of the act is, rely
solely upon its title as a guide to intelligent voting thereon.").
13. See, eg., Citizens Against Rent Control v. City of Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290 (1981) (invalidating
municipal ordinance adopted by initiative because it violated First Amendment); Epperson v.
Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968) (striking down state initiative prohibiting teaching of evolution in
public schools because it ran afoul of Establishment Clause); Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369
(1967) (invalidating on equal protection grounds initiative that made it more difficult to enact
housing anti-discrimination laws than other laws); Lucas v. Forty-Fourth Gen. Assembly, 377 U.S.
713 (1964) (holding that reapportionment scheme adopted by electorate violated Equal Protection
Clause); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (invalidating on substantive due process
grounds initiative requiring parents and guardians to send children to public schools); see also
William Howard Taft, Popular Government 64-71 (1913) (expressing concern with potential impact
of initiative process on fundamental rights).
14. See, e.g., City of Eastlake, 426 U.S. 668 (upholding in face of constitutional challenge voters'
decision to require that changes in land use plan be approved by 55% of vote in response to proposal
for zoning change for multifamily, high-rise apartment building); James, 402 U.S. 137 (upholding
initiative providing that no low income housing project be built without approval of majority of
electorate).
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certain circumstances has allowed a majority to burden the least
politically powerful. California's so-called alien land law passed by the
voters in 1920, which restricted the ability of noncitizens to own land, is
a vivid historical example.
5
Focusing on this underside of the initiative process, 'Professor Derrick
Bell published an article in 1978 in this law review arguing that
initiatives serve as a barrier to racial equality. 6 He reviewed some
historical examples of this phenomenon, such as the approval in the
1800s by voters in the Oregon territory of a referendum intended to
exclude free blacks from settling there.'7 Bell's concerns are reflected in
Proposition 187, an initiative passed by an overwhelming majority of
California voters (59-41%) in November 1994.'
The measure, if implemented, 9 would bar state and local governments
in California from providing non-emergency medical care, public
assistance, social services, and education to undocumented immigrants.20
It would further require California law enforcement, health and social
service agencies, and public school officials to report persons suspected
15. See text accompanying notes 91-100 (analyzing alien land laws).
16. See Derrick A. Bell, Jr., The Referendum: Democracy's Barrier to Racial Equality, 54 Wash.
L. Rev. 1 (1978); see also Julian N. Eule, Judicial Review of Direct Democracy, 99 Yale L.J. 1503
(1990) (advocating careful judicial review of laws enacted through initiattve because of potential
that majority will ignore rights of minorities). Others have questioned this a.,;sertion and have argued
that plebiscites are not so different from representative bodies. See, e.g., Clayton P. Gillette,
Plebiscites, Participation, and Collective Action in Local Government Law, 86 Mich. L. Rev. 930
(1988); Lynn A. Baker, Direct Democracy and Discrimination: A Public Choice Perspective, 67
Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 707 (1991).
17. See Bell, supra note 16, at 16-17; see also Louis J. Sirico, Jr., The Constitutionality of the
Initiative and Referendum, 65 Iowa L. Rev. 637, 641 (1980) ("From the an iblack plebiscites of the
nineteenth century [referring to fact that before Civil War, voters in Indiaaa, Illinois, Kansas, and
Oregon approved proposals for excluding black settlers] to today's efforts by homogeneous suburbs
to ward off heterogeneity, initiatives and referenda have played a questionable role.) (footnote
omitted).
18. See Tony Miller, Acting California Secretary of State, Statement of Vote, November 8, 1994,
General Election I 15 [hereinafter Statement of Vote].
19. The lawfulness of Proposition 187 was challenged in a number of lawsuits soon after its
passage. The courts have enjoined implem-ntation of most of its provisions. See infra note 196.
When this Article went to press in July 1995, the various legal challenges to the inititiative had not
been finally decided.
20. See Tony Miller, Acting California Secretary of State, California Ballot Pamphlet: General
Election November 8, 1994, at 50-53 [hereinafter California Ballot Pamphlet] (providing analysis of
proposition by nonpartisan state Legislative Analyst Office); California Senate Office of Research,
Analysis of State Propositions on the November 1994 Ballot, August 1994, at 69-105 (analyzing
measure).
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of being undocumented to the Immigration and Naturalization Service.21
Perhaps due to the complexities of the initiative's provisions, debate
during the heated campaign often was on an abstract plane. Proponents
proclaimed that passage of Proposition 187 would "send a message" to
the federal government that it must address illegal immigration.'
Opponents, particularly ethnic activist and immigrant rights groups,
countered that the initiative was nativist, racist, and motivated by
antipathy toward undocumented Mexicans and, more generally,
Mexican-Americans.'
Many factors in combination unquestionably led to the passage of
Proposition 187, including an ailing California economy and an
unprecedented budget crunch extending over a number of years, an
incumbent governor searching for an issue on which to base his re-
election campaign, and the growing pains of a changing multi-cultural
society. These considerations helped focus popular concern on
undocumented migration from Mexico. The public outcry culminated in
an attempt by the electorate of the state of California, at the center of the
immigration firestorm, to take a stab at immigration policymaking.
My contribution to the Symposium considers how Proposition 187 fits
into the peculiar politics of immigration, which in many ways are
without parallel. The hope is to shed light on the dynamics culminating
in the passage by the California electorate of a measure that in time may
21. I analyze the provisions and impacts of Proposition 187 from a different vantage point in
Kevin R. Johnson, Public Benefits and Immigration: The Intersection of Immigration Status,
Ethnicity, Gender, and Class, 42 UCLA L. Rev. (forthcoming 1995).
22. See Daniel M. Weintraub, Crime, Immigration Issues Helped Wilson, Poll Finds, L.A. Times,
Nov. 9, 1994, at Al (reporting results of exit polls showing that 78% ofthose voting for Proposition
187 believed that it "sends a message that needs to be sent" and 51% of that group agreed that
measure "will force the federal government to face the issue'); see also Magleby, supra note 7, at
179 (analyzing how voters in deciding on initiative focus on generalized ideology as opposed to
details of measure).
23. See Weintraub, supra note 22 (reporting that exit poll showed that 39% of persons voting
against Proposition 187, and 18% of the total voters, characterized the measure as "racist/anti-
Latino'); see also Fingerhut, Powers, Smith & Associates, National Survey of the Attitudes of
Hispanic Voters 37-38 (1994) (survey on file with the Washington Law Review) (showing that 39%
of Latinos surveyed agreed that politicians attacking "illegal immigrants" are "really attacking
people of different cultures and languages, like people of Hispanic background," that 73% were at
least "a little angry" when undocumented workers were attacked for taking jobs or causing crime,
and that 53% were at least "somewhat sympathetic" toward "illegal immigrants").
Claims of racism were not made exclusively by minorities. For example, the President of the
American Bar Association stated that California voters endorsed Proposition 187 "[biased on
unfounded economic arguments, ugly stereotypes and racial prejudice." Statement by ABA President
George E. Bushnell, Jr. on the Passage of California Proposition 187, PR Newswire, Nov. 9, 1994;
see also infra text accompanying note 42 (describing positions of prominent conservatives about
how initiative scapegoated undocumented immigrants).
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prove to be a watershed in immigration policymaking. In analyzing
Proposition 187, this Article generally considers the risks posed to
discrete and insular minorities by the initiative process and the
difficulties in mounting legal challenges under current constitutional
doctrine to democratic subordination of minority interests through
initiatives. It raises serious questions about whether lawmaking by
initiative fits properly into the constitutional scheme.
In performing this analysis, I uncovered something that struck me as
curious. One of the most vociferous, and serious, conentions made by
Proposition 187 opponents in the heated campaign was that, at bottom, it
is racist. This often is a damning claim in our legal culture. For a variety
of reasons, however, including the difficulties of proving claims of
discrimination under existing constitutional doctrine, the many lawsuits
challenging Proposition 187 do not squarely raise the issue. Part of the
reason is that it is difficult to separate the permissible from the
impermissible motives for supporting Proposition 187. On the one hand,
an anti-undocumented, or even an anti-immigrant, law is not necessarily
suspect. On the other hand, anti-people-of-color or anti-Mexican laws
generally are. Some Proposition 187 supporters were motivated by
impermissible factors while others were not. Some were motivated by a
mix of the two.
In light of the difficulties in ascertaining the motive of the electorate, a
court of law in all likelihood never will address the issue that
immediately jumps into the minds of many who condemn the initiative.
This phenomenon is consistent with more general charges that claims of
racism and discrimination increasingly go unheard and unresolved in the
United States. Only in the court of history will it be decided whether
Proposition 187-like the alien land laws of yesteryear--was passed for
invidious reasons and thus whether it is properly classified as racist and
discriminatory.24
Part I of the Article considers generally the nature of immigration
politics and how it affected the campaign culminating in the passage of
Proposition 187. Part II first focuses on the concerns of he framers of the
Constitution, particularly James Madison, with direct democracy and
their fear that the majority, motivated by "passion" and "self-interest,"
might enact laws detrimentally affecting minorities. It then illustrates
how these concerns came to pass in the fervent anti-Japanese campaign
24. See Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic, Images of the Outsider in Ameican Law and Culture:
Can Free Expression Remedy Systemic Social ills?, 77 Cornell L. Rev. 1258 (1992) (analyzing how
history shows that, although today we view many practices in retrospect zs racist, they were not
viewed as such at the time).
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resulting in the passage through initiative of the alien land law in
California and notes the parallels between that initiative campaign and
the one culminating in the passage of Proposition 187. This part also
considers the evidence that nativist and racist sentiment influenced the
initiative's passage and how, under current equal protection doctrine, it
nonetheless would be difficult to successfully challenge Proposition 187
for those reasons. Part III concludes the Article by considering the
potential legacy of Proposition 187.
I. THE UNIQUE POLITICS OF IMMIGRATION AND ITS
IMPACT ON IMMIGRATION LAW AND POLICYMAKING
The politics of immigration in the United States, an issue-area where
bizarre alliances resulting from the desires of divergent groups are the
norm rather than the exception, may be without equal. As one would
expect, this greatly influences the formulation of immigration law and
policy. Most notably, the perhaps unique interest group interaction has
sporadically produced extreme immigration policy choices. The judiciary
has deferred to some most extreme policy pronouncements even when
the policy judgment would be patently unconstitutional if the rights of
citizens, rather than noncitizens, were at stake.
A. Some History
Extremes mar the history of immigration law and policy in the United
States. Nativist outcries have been directed at the leading immigrant
group of the day, such as the Irish in the early and mid-1800s, the
Chinese in the late 1800s, and Mexicans at various times in the twentieth
century.' One explanation for the fluctuations is the absence in
immigration matters of the usual moderating influences on the political
process. This results from the limited membership rights of immigrants
in the community.
Immigrants, at least prior to naturalization, have minimal input into
the political process.26 Those lawfully in the country who have not
become naturalized citizens, referred to in immigration jargon as lawful
25. See generally John Higharn, Strangers in the Land: Patterns of American Nativism 1860-
1925 (1955); Kenneth L. Karst, Belonging to America 81-104 (1989).
26. For a more thorough analysis of the complexities of immigration politics, see Kevin R.
Johnson, Los Olvidados: Images of the Immigrant, Political Power of Noncitizens, and Immigration
Law and Enforcement, 1993 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 1139.
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permanent residents, as well as undocumented immigrants, cannot vote.27
Although immigrant rights and some ethnic groups lobby aggressively
for immigrants, their pull with politicians naturally is restricted by the
electoral powerlessness of their constituency. As Professor Lani Guinier
has succinctly stated with respect to minority citizens, "[a] discrete and
insular electoral minority often remains an outvoted legislative
minority. 28 This statement would seem to apply with even greater force
with respect to disenfranchised noncitizens.
Harsh immigration policies historically have been proposed by those
searching for answers to the particular political, social, and economic
woes of the day.29 In part because of the limited polilical power of the
immigrant lobby, the proposals at various times-particularly times of
crisis-have met only token resistance." This ready-made recipe for
extremism may account for why immigration law and policy diverge so
dramatically from other areas of public law.
Although the courts in other circumstances may serve as a moderating
influence on political excesses that injure minorities,3' the judiciary not
infrequently is deferential to the immigration decisions of the political
branches of the federal government. The so-called plenary power
doctrine, though it has suffered cracks in its armor in its 100-plus years
of existence, still shields some rather extreme immigntion judgments.32
27. See Gerald L. Neuman, "We Are The People": Alien Suffrage in German and American
Perspective, 13 Mich. J. Int'l L. 259 (1992); Jamin B. Raskin, Legal Aliens, Local Citizens: The
Historical, Constitutional and Theoretical Meanings of Alien Suffrage, 141 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1391
(1993); Gerald M. Rosberg, Aliens and Equal Protection: Why Not the Right to Vote?, 75 Mich. L.
Rev. 1092 (1977).
28. Lani Guinier, No Two Seats: The Elusive Quest for Political Equali,,, 77 Va. L. Rev. 1413,
1416 (1991).
29. Proposition 187, in my view, is an example. See infra text accompanying notes 101-54
(analyzing factors culminating in passage of initiative).
30. See, e.g., T. Alexander Aleinikoff, David A. Martin, & Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration:
Process and Policy 2-5 (3d ed. 1995) (summarizing anti-Chinese legislation passed in late 1800s).
31. See, e.g., Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
32. See, e.g., Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787 (1977); Mathews v. Diaz,, 426 U.S. 67 (1976);
Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753 (1972); Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S.
206 (1953); United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537 (1950). Because courts at
times have employed a variety of devices to avoid invoking the doctrine and to engage in meaningful
judicial review of immigration decisions, the force of the plenary power doz-trine to some extent has
eroded over time. See Hiroshi Motomura, The Curious Evolution of Immigration Law: Procedural
Surrogates for Substantive Constitutional Rights, 92 Colum. L. Rev. 1625 (1992); Hiroshi
Motomura, Immigration Law After a Century of Plenary Power, 100 Yale K-.L 545 (1990); Peter H.
Schuck, The Transformation of Immigration Law, 84 Colum. L. Rev. 1 (1984). Still, the doctrine
remains intact and has been invoked by the courts to shield from review some deeply troubling
immigration decisions. See Michael Scaperlanda, Polishing the Tarnished Golden Door, 1993 Wis.
L. Rev. 965, 994-1002.
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While first employed to uphold laws passed by Congress generally
excluding the immigration of Chinese,33 a version of the doctrine
surfaced more recently in the Supreme Court's refusal to disturb the
Executive Branch's decision to interdict and repatriate Haitians fleeing
political violence.34 Put simply, the political branches of the federal
government, in which noncitizens have little input, often are given
considerable freedom by the courts in immigration matters. In contrast,
the Supreme Court, although not entirely consistent, has appeared more
willing to invalidate state alienage classifications than it has been to
strike down federal immigration laws.36
In sum, the political process is unlikely to offer enduring protection to
immigrants and, at certain times, tends to result in rather extreme anti-
immigrant laws and policies. Unlike other areas in which courts serve as
protectors of the rights of minorities, the judiciary cannot be relied upon
to intervene to shield noncitizens from democratic excesses.
B. Political Correctness and Immigration
In light of the fact that the political branches frequently have the final
say on immigration law and policy, it is important to have a basic
understanding of the position of various interest groups on immigration.37
It is difficult to peg a so-called politically correct position for
immigration or to pinpoint "liberal" and "conservative" positions on the
issue. Some conservative elements of society have been extremely
33. See Chae Chan Ping v. United States (the Chinese Exclusion Case), 130 U.S. 581 (1889).
34. See Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2549, 2567 (1993). For criticism of the
Supreme Court's decision, see Harold Kongju Koh, The "Haiti Paradigm " in United States Human
Rights Policy, 103 Yale L.L 2391 (1994).
35. See Peter H. Schuck & Theodore Hsien Wang, Continuity and Change: Patterns of
Immigration Litigation in the Courts, 1979-1990, 45 Stan. L. Rev. 115, 176 (1992) (summarizing
conclusion of empirical study showing that "overall success rate for aliens in court declined from
36% in 1979 to 27% in the 1989-90 period").
36. See, e.g., Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971) (invalidating state law limiting alien
eligibility for welfare benefits); see also Laurence H. Tribe, American Constitutional Law § 16-23, at
1544-53 (2d ed. 1988) (analyzing Court decisions scrutinizing state alienage classifications under
equal protection clause); infra text accompanying notes 159-60, 187 (comparing differential judicial
treatment afforded state and federal alienage classifications). These decisions undoubtedly will bear
on the various challenges to Proposition 187.
37. For a fascinating analysis of the politics culminating in important changes to the immigration
laws in the 1980s, including an insightful analysis of the shifting alliances of the various interests
groups, see Peter H. Schuck, The Politics of Rapid Legal Change: Immigration Policy in the 1980s,
16 Am. Pol. Dev. 37 (1992); see also Holly Idelson, Immigration: Bridging Gap Between Ideas and
Action, 13 Cong. Q. 1065 (Apr. 15, 1995) (describing various political divisions on immigration
issues in 104th Congress).
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intolerant of immigrants at various times in U.S. hi;tory. 8 Consistent
with that tradition, a Republican presidential candidate, Patrick
Buchanan, strenuously advocated an all-out effort to seal the U.S.-
Mexico border, a plank in the 1992 Republican Party platform.39 In
contrast, other conservative bastions with a more free-market orientation,
including some business interests that desire a ready supply of low-wage
labor, have called for fewer rather than more immigration restrictions.4"
The campaign over Proposition 187 nicely contnsts the divergent
views of conservatives on immigration. A moderate Republican governor
of California, though not one of the original sponsors of the measure,
became the vanguard for the initiative and made immigration the central
issue in his ultimately successful re-election campaign.4 In contrast, two
nationally prominent Republicans spoke out against Proposition 187 and
contended that its proponents were scapegoating irmmigrants for the
state's economic woes.42
38. See Karst, supra note 25, at 81-104 (discussing various nativistic epochs in U.S. history). In
contrast, some religious groups, often viewed as conservative, including elements of the Catholic
Church, have advocated a less restrictionist stance toward immigration. S,,e, e.g., David Gonzales,
Bishops Assail Rule Hostile to Immigrants, N.Y. Times, Nov. 18, 1994, at A21 (reporting that
National Conference of Catholic Bishops urged greater emphasis on federJl immigration policies as
opposed to punitive measures such as Propcsition 187); Roger Mahoney, Perspective on Proposition
187; Protect the Children from Politics, L.A. Times, Oct. 25, 1994, at B7 (Catholic archbishop
criticizing Proposition 187); see also Ann Crittenden, Sanctuary: A Story of American Conscience
and Law in Collision (1988) (describing religious persons involved in providing sanctuary to Central
Americans fleeing political persecution in 1980s).
39. See John Marelius, Confusion Over Plaform 's Border Plank Drives GOP Delegates Up the
Wall, San Diego Union-Trib., Aug. 18, 1992, at A7.
40. See, e.g., Schuck, supra note 37, at 63, 65 (noting that growers had opposed Chinese
exclusion laws and Mexican border controls and sought to defeat employer sanctions in Immigration
Reform and Control Act). Indeed, even California Governor Pete Wilson, while a Senator, supported
a temporary farm labor program. See Robert Pear, Senate Kills Plan on Ahen Workers, N.Y. Times,
Sept. 13, 1985, at A17 (reporting that Wilson proposed such an amendment to immigration reform
bill).
41. See Weintraub, supra note 22. Candidates, particularly in California, running for state-wide
office have backed initiatives in hopes of improving chances for winning election. See David B.
Magleby, Let the Voters Decide? An Assessment of the Initiative and Referendum Process, 66 U.
Colo. L. Rev. 13, 28-29 (1995) (offering examples of candidates for state..wide election sponsoring
initiatives); Eugene C. Lee, California, in Referendums: A Comparative Study of Practice and
Theory 87, 99 (David Butler & Austin Ranney eds., 1978) (offering examples of how candidates'
election campaigns were tied to initiatives in California).
42. See Ronald Brownstein & Patrick J. McDonnell, Kemp, Bennett and INS Chief Decry Prop.
187, L.A. Times, Oct. 19, 1994, at Al (reporting that Bill Bennett aid Jack Kemp registered
opposition to Proposition 187); see also Ron K. Unz, Experience Reveals No Need for S.O.S.,
Sacramento Bee, Oct. 23, 1994, at F3 (stating opinion of conservative challenger to California
Governor Pete Wilson in Republican Party primary that Proposition 187 was unnecessary); William
J. Bennett, Immigration: Making Americans, Wash. Post, Dec. 4, 1994, at C7 (arguing against
Proposition 187 and related immigration measures); Dick Kirschten, Second Thoughts, Nat'l J., Jan.
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Liberal ranks in the United States also historically have been divided
on immigration. At various times in U.S. history, immigrants were
readily integrated into urban Democratic political machines.43 Such
integration occurred more easily when the immigrants could more easily
shed their "immigrantness" and become citizens with the right to vote.
That, however, was something far easier accomplished by the
predominantly European immigrants of past generations than for
immigrants of color who have come in increasing numbers to the United
States since 1965. 44 With low naturalization rates for the largest group of
immigrants-Mexican nationals-to the United States,45 political, social,
and economic assimilation has not been as smooth as it was for some
previous immigration generations.46 Still, the Democratic Party has
voiced concern for immigrants' rights, often at the behest of certain
ethnic activist groups.'
At the same time, however, some traditional liberal interest groups
historically have been deeply antagonistic toward immigrants and
immigration.48 Organized labor, for example, was one of the strongest
proponents of the racist Chinese exclusion laws of the late 1800s. 49 Labor
21, 1995, at 150 (noting concern of business with Proposition 187). Concerns with the political
repercussions of being labeled anti-immigrant and anti-minority may prevent a Republican-led
Congress from proceeding with far-reaching immigration reforms. See Marc Sandalow, After Much
Ado on Immigration, GOP Backs Off, S.F. Chron., Mar. 13,1995, at A3.
43. See Johnson, supra note 26, at 1150-52.
44. See Stephen H. Legomsky, Immigration, Equality and Diversity, 31 Colum. J. Transnat'l L.
319, 328-29 (1993).
45. See U.S. Dep't of Justice, 1993 Statistical Yearbook of the Immigration and Naturalization
Service 130 (1994) [hereinafter INS 1993 Statistical Yearbook] (presenting data showing that 16.6%
of immigrants from Mexico for time period under review naturalized compared to 39.6% of
immigrants from all countries); U.S. Dep't of Justice, 1992 Statistical Yearbook of the Immigration
and Naturalization Service 130 (1993) (presenting data showing that 16.2% of immigrants from
Mexico for time period under review naturalized compared to 38.7% of immigrants from all
countries).
46. See Karst, supra note 25, at 87-90 (analyzing difficulties of assimilation of immigrants of
different races and cultural backgrounds). This is not to suggest that assimilation was easy for any
generation of immigrants. See Nathan Glazer & Daniel P. Moynihan, Beyond the Melting Pot (2d ed.
1970); see also T. Alexander Aleinikoff, A Case for Race-Consciousness, 91 Colum. L. Rev. 1060,
1124 (1991) (noting that invitation to immigrants on Statue of Liberty "has always been an offer to
join us on our terms. The immigrant story is one of assimilation, not multi-culturalism.).
47. See Schuck, supra note 37, at 70-74.
48. See Kevin R. Johnson, Free Trade and Closed Borders: NAFTA and Mexican Immigration to
the United States, 27 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 937, 945-47 (1994).
49. See Aleinikoff, Martin, & Motomura, supra note 30, at 2 (describing role of Workingmen's
Party in California in passage of Chinese exclusion laws); Schuck, supra note 37, at 63-64 (noting
that for most of the century "unions, like most of their rank and file, had favored restrictions on
immigration"); see also Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633, 651-53 (1948) (Murphy, J., concurring)
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backed employer sanctions, bitterly opposed by immigrant rights and
Latino activist groups, in the Immigration Reform and Control Act.5 In
recent years, some claiming sympathy with the interests of labor have
advocated the need to limit immigration." A number of
environmentalists have advocated immigration restrictions.52 Not
surprisingly in light of the support of traditional liberal interest groups
for immigration restrictions, many Democrats in recent years, including
President Clinton, advocated increased immigration enforcement
measures.
5 3
During the 1990s, the divide among liberals on the subject of
immigration by some accounts has widened. Ethnic minority groups,
historically in the Democratic fold, typify the dissension. On the one
hand, Latino activist organizations generally have opposed restrictionist
measures in no small part because the Latino communmty is composed of
a sizable immigrant population, and the citizen component fears the
adverse ripple effects of heightened immigration enforcement efforts.54
On the other hand, some African-Americans have expressed reservations
about the perceived negative impacts of immigration on their
(noting that opposition to Chinese immigration in mid-to-late 1800s "came f'rom trade unionists, who
feared economic competition, and from politicians, who sought union support" and that immigration
by Japanese in early 1900s was resented by "[w]hite workers" who demanded "that Japanese
immigration be limited or prohibited entirely") (footnote omitted).
50. See Schuck, supra note 37, at 64. A prominent African-American ',rganization did as well.
See Richard L. Strout, Controversial Immigration Reform Gets New Hearing in Washington,
Christian Sci. Mon., Mar. 1, 1983, at 3 (reporting that NAACP and organized labor endorsed
employer sanctions proposed in immigration reform legislation).
51. See, e.g., Vernon M. Briggs, Jr., Mass Immigration and the Nationa' Interest (1992) (arguing
that immigration policy and circumstances of domestic labor market are out of synch); Philip L.
Martin & David A. Martin, The Endless Quest: Helping America's Farm Workers 170-78 (1994)
(concluding that one important way to improve working conditions of firmworkers was through
better control of immigration); see also Federation for American Immigration Reform, Immigration
2000: The Century of the New American Sweatshop (1992) (compiling articles articulating theme
that immigration has had negative impacts on U.S. labor market).
52. See, e.g., Garrett Hardin, Living Within Limits 276-93 (1993) (noted environmentalists
arguing for immigration restrictions); Robert W. Fox & Ira H. Mehlman, Crowding Out the Future:
World Population Growth, U.S. Immigration, and Pressures on Natural Resources (1992)
(publication of Federation for American Immigration Reform emphasizing environmental
justifications for immigration restrictions); see also Peter L. Reich, Environmental Metaphor in the
Alien Benefits Debate, 42 UCLA L. Rev. (forthcoming 1995) (analyzing -nvironmental arguments
made for restricting public benefits available to noncitizens).
53. See, e.g., James Bomemeier, Clinton Moves to Curb Illegal Immigration, L.A. Times, Feb. 8,
1995, at A3 (proposing increased immigration enforcement); Clinton Vows More Immigration
Enforcement, Bills Introduced in Congress, 72 Interpreter Releases 169 (Jan. 30, 1995)
(summarizing immigration enforcement themes in President Clinton's State of the Union speech).
54. See Kevin R. Johnson, Civil Rights and Immigration: Challenges for the Latino Community in
the Twenty-First Century, 8 La Raza .J. (forthcoming 1995).
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community." The much-publicized conflict in Los Angeles, California
between the African-American and Korean immigrant communities is a
tangible example of the concerns motivating African-American
ambivalence toward immigration 6
Though perhaps less visibly the case than for Republicans, a split
among Democrats also emerged in the Proposition 187 campaign. Many
traditional liberal groups, especially Latino activists, strongly lobbied
against Proposition 187. African-American activist groups appeared less
active, and a significant number of African-Americans (as well as Asian-
Americans) ultimately supported the measure.
As reflected by the measure's widespread support, Proposition 187
held bipartisan appeal. This may result in part from the fact that the
initiative tapped into populist sentiment on at least several levels. At one
level, Proposition 187 pitted citizens against undocumented immigrants
who were perceived to injure working citizens by taking jobs. In
addition, the initiative, at least in part, was an effort directed at keeping
"those" Mexicans with "their" language and "their" culture out of the
state. 8 Such nativism, dating at least as far back as the Alien and
Sedition Acts of the 1790s,"9 has not infrequently enjoyed popular
support in the United States. At another level, support for Proposition
187 challenged the federal government, which is entrusted with
regulating immigration. Part of the tension between the state and federal
55. See Lawrence H. Fuchs, The Reactions of Black Americans to Immigration, in Immigration
Reconsidered: History, Sociology and Politics 293 (Virginia Yans-McLaughlin ed., 1990); Jack
Miles, Blacks vs. Browns, The Atlantic, Oct. 1992, at 41; see also Otis L. Graham Jr. & Roy Beck,
To Help Inner City, Cut Flow ofImmigrants, L.A. Times, May 19, 1992, at B7 (contending that
excessive immigration may contribute to plight of African-Americans and suggesting that violence
in Los Angeles in spring of 1992 may have been caused in part by such immigration-related tension).
In past nativist epochs, African-Americans have joined in the anti-immigrant clamor. See Fuchs,
supra, at 296-97 (describing criticism of Asian and Mexican immigration by black leaders and
media).
56. See Bill Ong Hing, Beyond the Rhetoric of Assimilation and Cultural Pluralism: Addressing
the Tension of Separatism and Conflict in an Immigration-Driven Multiracial Society, 81 Cal. L.
Rev. 863, 889 (1993). Another example is the conflict between African-Americans and Cuban
immigrants in south Florida. See Alejandro Portes & Alex Stepick, City on the Edge: The
Transformation of Miami 176-202 (1993).
57. See Patrick J. McDonnell, State's Diversity Doesn't Reach Voting Booth, L.A. Times, Nov.
10, 1994, at Al (reporting that exit polls showed that almost one-half of the African-American and
Asian-American voters supported the Proposition, compared to overwhelming rejection by Latino
voters (77% opposed-23% in favor)); see also infra notes 144-46 (providing exit poll results
breaking down the vote by ethnic group).
58. See infra text accompanying notes 147-54.
59. See generally James Morton Smith, Freedom's Fetters: The Alien and Sedition Laws and
American CivilLiberties (1956).
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governments with respect to immigration results from the fact that the
federal government receives the bulk of tax revenues from the
undocumented, while state and local governments provide most of the
services." By supporting the measure, the taxpayersi of the state of
California challenged the federal government.
II. POPULAR DEMOCRACY, ALIENS, AND PRO:POSITION 187
This section first will describe the concerns of the framers of the
Constitution with popular democracy. It then will analyze how initiatives
at various times have adversely impacted minorities, including
noncitizens. Finally, it will consider the formidable barriers to the
mounting of successful challenges to such laws under the Equal
Protection Clause.
A. The Framers' Suspicion of Direct Democracy
From the day of the nation's founding, the excesses of popular
democracy, often described as "mob rule" and "tyranny of the majority,"
have preoccupied Americans.6' A desire to bridle the unfettered
democratic impulse unquestionably influenced the framing of the
Constitution.62 Indeed, the Bill of Rights in part sought to constrain the
democratic potential for trampling upon individual righs.
63
60. See Johnson, supra note 21 (analyzing federal-state tensions resulting from fiscal
consequences of undocumented immigration). See generally Urban Institute, Fiscal Impact of
Undocumented Aliens: Selected Estimates for Seven States (1994) (estimating costs to states of
undocumented immigration); Michael Fix & Jeffrey S. Passel, Urban Institute, Immigration and
Immigrants: Setting the Record Straight (1994) (estimating that costs to sates are outweighed by
benefits bestowed by undocumented immigration).
61. See Gordon S. Wood, The Creation of the American Republic 1776-1787, at 19 (1969)
(analyzing framers' fear that "the disorder of absolute liberty would inevitably lead to the tyranny of
the dictator'); William M. Wiecek, The Guarantee Clause of the U.S. Constitution 11-50 (1972)
(analyzing origins of representative government in the Constitution and framers' fear of direct
democracy).
62. See Eule, supra note 16, at 1522-26 (analyzing concerns expressed in Federalist Papers on
this point); Gillette, supra note 16, at 940-44 (recounting "tradition of anti-participatory thought"
influencing framers). For skepticism over the orthodox view that the framers feared direct
democracy, see Akhil Reed Amar, The Constitutional Meaning of Republicc, Government: Popular
Sovereignty, Majority Rule, and the Denominator Problem, 65 U. Colo. L. Rev. 749, 756-59 (1994).
63. See West Virginia Bd. ofEduc. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943) ("The very purpose of a
Bill of Rights was to withdraw certain subjects from the vicissitudes of political controversy, to
place them beyond the reach of majorities.., and to establish them as legal principles to be applied
by the courts.... [F]undamental rights may not be submitted to vote; they depend on the outcome of
no elections!).
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James Madison was vocal in articulating the concerns with potential
democratic excesses. He observed that "there are particular moments in
public affairs, when the people stimulated by some irregular passion, or
some illicit advantage, or misled by the artful misrepresentations of
interested men, may call for measures which they themselves will
afterwards be the most ready to lament and condemn."' Madison
elaborated on the specific dangers in The Federalist No. 10:
[A] pure democracy, by which I mean, a Society, consisting of a
small number of citizens, who assemble and administer the
Government in person, can admit of no cure for the mischiefs of
faction. A common passion or interest will, in almost every case, be
felt by a majority of the whole; a communication and concert
results from the form of Government itself, and there is nothing to
check the inducements to sacrifice the weaker party, or an
obnoxious individual. Hence it is, that such Democracies have ever
been spectacles of turbulence and contention; have ever been found
incompatible with personal security, or the rights of property; and
they have in general been as short in their lives, as they have been
violent in their deaths.65
Put simply, "[i]f a majority be united by common interest, the rights of
the minority will be insecure."'
Hans Linde has succinctly described the "passion" and "interest" to
which Madison referred in these passages:
[The framers] feared that governmental power would be misused
from motives of "interest" and "passion," which they meant to
contain by designing divided and deliberative institutions of
government. The two terms had a long and familiar history in
eighteenth century political theory. Interest meant the pursuit of
personal self-interest, mainly in the form of wealth. Political
"passions" were not selfish political desires but collective emotions
such as love, fear, or hatred. The politics of collective passion
appeals to people's identification with one or rejection of another
social group for reasons transcending an ordinary political
64. The Federalist No. 63, at 425 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961). "What bitter
anguish would not the people of Athens have often escaped, if their government had contained so
provident a safeguard against the tyranny of their own passions?" Id.
65. The Federalist No. 10, at 61 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961) (emphasis added);
see also The Federalist No. 14, at 83-89 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961)
(distinguishing between democratic and republican government).
66. The Federalist No. 51, at 351 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
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disagreement about policy. In the European and American
experience known to the founding generation, the strongest
passions divided communities and nations into contending religious
factions, or "sects, " in Madison's terms, until race and non-
European immigration kindled new passions.67
One aim of the framers was to create a representative form of
government that ensured against the democratic excesses resulting from
the passion and self-interest that so troubled Madison. '58 As the concern
with "self-interest" suggests, the primary concern of the framers may
have been with the tyranny of the majority over the property rights of the
minority. With the experience of government under the Articles of
Confederation, including the famous debtors' uprising known as Shay's
Rebellion, fresh in mind,69 the Federalists feared that, iunless checks were
put in place, the debtor majority might trample the rights of the creditor
minority in the political process, as well as in the courts. 0
The concern with the excesses of passion in modem zonstitutional law
revolves around discrete and insular minorities.71 As tme to some extent
in any form of democracy, minorities are especially threatened by
popular democracy.72 Because of that threat, Professor Julian Eule has
argued for searching judicial review of laws enacted by the electorate:
It may be politic to invoke an abiding trust in public judgment, but
racism, sexism, nativism, and self-interest are too much a part of
67. Hans A. Linde, Who Is Responsible for Republican Government?, 65 U. Colo. L. Rev. 709,
723 (1994) [hereinafter Linde, Republican Government] (emphasis added).
68. Some have suggested that initiatives may violate the guarantee clause of Article IV, § 4,
which provides that the federal government pledges to "guarantee to every State in this Union a
Republican Form of Government." See, e.g., Hans A. Linde, When is Initiative Lawmaking Not
"Republican Government"?, 17 Hastings Const. L.Q. 159, 169 (1989).
69. See Wood, supra note 61, at 409-13; see also Wiecek, supra note 61, at 27-42.
70. See Wythe Holt, "To Establish Justice". Politics, the Judiciary Act of* 1789, and the Invention
of the Federal Courts, 1989 Duke L.. 1421, 1459 (analyzing history surrounding creation of federal
courts and referring to "pro-creditor Constitutional Convention").
71. See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 nA (1938).
72. The Supreme Court has recognized this potential:
[W]hen the State's allocation of power places unusual burdens on the ability of racial groups to
enact legislation specifically designed to overcome the "special condition" of prejudice, the
governmental action seriously "curtail[s] the operation of those political processes ordinarily to
be relied upon to protect minorities." United States v. Carolene Products Co .... In a most
direct sense, this implicates the judiciary's special role in safeguarding the interests of those
groups that are "relegated to such a position of political powerlessness as to command
extraordinary protection from the majoritarian political process."
Washington v. Seattle School Dist., 458 U.S. 457,486 (1982) (citations & fcotnotes omitted).
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American history to be ignored. In a multitude of ways we continue
to demonstrate our fear of the other and our distrust of difference.
While public proclamations of racist attitudes have lost their
respectability, prejudice continues to receive an airing in the
privacy of the voting booth... [T]he very definition of
unpopularity is that unpopular groups normally will fare poorly at
the ballot box.73
History reflects that Professor Eule's fears of popular democracy are
not unwarranted. For example, two of the ten most popular initiatives in
California electoral history implicated the rights of minorities.74
B. Popular Democracy in Action
The last twenty-five years have seen a resurgence in lawmaking by
initiative in some states, particularly California." Initiatives have, among
many other purposes, sought to protect the environment,76 reform the
73. Eule, supra note 16, at 1553 (footnotes omitted); see Magleby, supra note 7, at 184-94
(expressing similar concerns); Bell, supra note 16, at 19 ("Appeals to prejudice, oversimplification
of the issues, and exploitation of legitimate concerns by promising simplistic solutions to complex
problems often characterize referendum and initiative campaigns.") (footnote omitted); see also
Linde, Republican Government, supra note 67 (advocating need for careful judicial review of
initiatives appealing to "popular passion" or self-interest); Cynthia L. Fountaine, Note, Lousy
Lawmaking: Questioning the Desirability and Constitutionality of Legislating by Initiative, 61 S.
Cal. L. Rev. 733, 747-49 (1988) (expressing concern with potential in initiative process for
"majority tyranny" to the detriment of minorities).
For a critique of Professor Eule's thesis, see Robin Charlow, Judicial Review, Equal Protection
and the Problem with Plebiscites, 79 Cornell L. Rev. 527 (1994) and Baker, supra note 16, at 752-
75. Professor Eule responded to some criticism in Julian N. Eule, Representative Government: The
People's Choice, 67 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 777 (1991) [hereinafter Eule, People's Choice].
74. See March Fong Eu, California Secretary of State, A History of the California Initiative
Process 9 (1992) (noting that Alien Land Law (Proposition 1) received 75% of popular vote and
Official State Language (Proposition 63) received 73% of vote); see also id. at 7 (noting that
"Voting Material in English Only" initiative received nearly 71% of votes cast).
75. See Magleby, supra note 7, at 26-3 1; see, e.g., March Fong Eu, California Secretary of State,
supra note 74, at 13-14 (showing that from 1950 to 1970, only 22 initiatives qualified for the ballot
while from 1971 to 1990, 84 did). This does not mean that all are happy with the process. See
Legislature of State of California v. Eu, 816 P.2d 1309, 1336 (Cal. 1991) (Mosk, J., dissenting) ("At
the outset, I must observe that 'The initiative process is out of control in California.") (citation
omitted).
One political scientist suggests that the increase in initiatives tending to reflect concerns of the
white middle class in California, may be directly related to the increasing representation of
minorities in representative bodies. See Bruce Cain, The Contemporary Context of Ethnic and Racial
Politics in California, in Racial and Ethnic Politics in California 9, 23-24 (Bryan 0. Jackson &
Michael B. Preston, eds., 1991).
76. See San Diego Coast Regional Comm'n v. See the Sea, Ltd., 513 P.2d 129 (Cal. 1973)
(interpreting Coastal Zone Conservation Act of 1972, Proposition 20).
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insurance industry,77 and impose term limits on elected officials. 8
Although a proposal for a national initiative process has not come to
fruition,79  some successful state initiatives have had national
implications, perhaps the most prominent example being California's
Proposition 13, which reduced property taxes and triggered a so-called
Taxpayer Revolt.8
A proposition's effect on minority groups may be direct or indirect.
Examples of an initiative directly affecting a minority group are those
involving the rights of lesbians and gay men." At times, certain racial
minorities have been targeted by a plebiscite. For example, in 1879, the
California voters voiced their opinion on Chinese immigration. The
results were 883 "for Chinese immigration" and 154,638 "against
Chinese immigration."82 California Governor William Irwin explained
the need for the vote in a way that foreshadowed the arguments made in
support of Proposition 187:
[W]hy is it necessary or desirable that the position of the people of
this State, or this Coast, on this question should be understood by
the people on the other side of the continent? It is because we can
obtain effectual relief from the evils of Chinese irmmaigration only
77. See 20th Century Ins. Co. v. Garamendi, 878 P.2d 566 (Cal. 1994) (reviewing challenges to
regulations implementing rate rollback provisions of Proposition 103, which made fundamental
changes in insurance regulation in California).
78. See Daniel Hays Lowenstein, Are Congressional Term Limits Constitutional?, 18 Harv. J.L.
& Pub. Pol'y 1, 2 & nn.2-3 (1994) (listing increasing number of states thzt have adopted through
initiative some sort of term limits for members of Congress).
79. See Cronin, supra note 2, at 157-95; see also Ronald J. Allen, The National Initiative
Proposal: A Preliminary Analysis, 58 Neb. L. Rev. 965 (1979). Compare Bruce Ackerman, We the
People: Foundations 54-56 (1991) (suggesting possibility of national referenda on major
constitutional transformation) with Charles L. Black, Jr., National Lawmaking by Initiative? Let's
Think Twice, Human Rights, Fall 1979, at 28 (questioning propriety ofnatioral initiative proposal).
80. See Cronin, supra note 2, at 157-95; see also David D. Schmidt, Citizen Lawmakers 125-45
(1989).
81. See, e.g., Evans v. Romer, 882 P.2d 1335 (Colo. 1994) (enjoining enforcement of state
constitutional amendment directed at gays, lesbians, and bisexuals), cert. granted, 115 S. Ct. 1092
(1995); Equality Found. v. City of Cincinnati, 54 F.3d 261 (6th Cir. 1995) (rejecting challenge to
voter-enacted city charter amendment barring "preferential treatment" fbr gays, lesbians, and
bisexuals); St. Paul Citizens for Human Rights v. City Council, 289 N.W.2d 402 (Minn. 1979)
(upholding local initiative repealing St. Paul gay rights ordinance); see also Hans A. Linde, When
Initiative Lawmaking is Not "Republican Government": The Campaign Against Homosexuality, 72
Or. L. Rev. 19 (1993) (analyzing 1992 campaign in Oregon on initiative aimed at homosexuals);
Merrick v. Board of Higher Educ., 841 P.2d 646 (Or. App. 1992) (invalidating initiative under
Oregon constitution).
82. Biennial Message of Governor William Irwin to the Legislature of the State of California,
Twenty-Third Session, 1880, at 36, reprinted in Appendix to the Journals of the Senate and
Assembly of the Twenty-Third Session of the Legislature of the State of California.
Racism, Nativism, and Proposition 187
through the action of the Federal Government. And to secure such
action, we will be compelled to get a preponderance of the public
sentiment of the whole country into harmony with ourselves on this
question. When it becomes definitely and authoritatively known,
that the opposition to the Chinese in this State, and on this Coast, is
not limited to a class-and that class the least intelligent-but
embraces substantially the whole people, irrespective of classes, we
may expect that this opposition will receive respectful
consideration from the people of the whole country. 3
In his inaugural address, Governor George C. Perkins denied that race
influenced the vote on Chinese immigration.'
A type of initiative with a more indirect effect on minority groups is
the almost-perennial anti-crime measure that has a disproportionate
impact on minority communities." Similarly, tax and related measures
that primarily benefit the middle class may place a disproportionate
burden on the poor and minorities.86
Consider for a moment the initiatives designating English as the
"official" language, often referred to as the English-Only laws, passed by
the electorates of a number of states. 7 Despite the fact that the laws are
facially neutral, their impact often is most directly felt by particular
national origin minorities. This may be explained by the linkage between
83. Id.; see also Elmer Clarence Sandmeyer, The Anti-Chinese Movement in California 62-63
(1991) (describing election and how it fit into broader anti-Chinese sentiment in state).
84. Inaugural Address of His Excellency, George C. Perkins, Governor of California, Jan. 8th
1880, at 9, reprinted in Appendix to the Journals of the Senate and Assembly of the Twenty-Third
Session of the Legislature of the State of California (1880).
85. See, eg., Raven v. Deukmejian, 801 P.2d 1077 (Cal. 1990) (reviewing Crime Victims Justice
Reform Act, Proposition 115); Brosnahan v. Brown, 651 P.2d 274 (Cal. 1982) (reviewing Victims'
Bill of Rights, Proposition 8); People v. Superior Court, 37 Cal. Rptr. 364 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995)
(reviewing "Three Strikes" initiative, Proposition 184).
86. See Eule, supra note 16, at 1560; see also Bell, supra note 16, at 19 n.72 ("The success of
California's initiative limiting property taxes, Proposition 13, can be seen as a response not only to
high tax rates but also to the belief of many voters that approval would result in reduction of funds
paid to unwed mothers and other welfare recipients.").
87. See Yniguez v. Arizonans for Official English, 42 F.3d 1217, 1224 nn.9-10 (9th Cir. 1994)
(listing states), petition for reh g en banc granted, 53 F.3d 1084 (9th Cir. 1995); see also Daniel L
Garfield, Comment, Don't Box Me In: The Unconstitutionality of Amendment 2 and English-Only
Amendments, 89 Nw. U. L. Rev. 690, 691-92 & n.9 (1995) (stating that voters in seven states,
Alabama, Arizona, California, Colorado, Florida, Nebraska, and Hawaii, had passed some version of
English-Only law); Montero v. Meyer, 13 F.3d 1444 (10th Cir. 1994) (deciding procedural challenge
to Colorado's English-Only initiative); Eu, supra note 74, at 7 (noting that Proposition 38 in 1984
entitled "Voting Material in English Only" garnered 70.7% of vote).
647
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language and ethnicity in the United States." Moreover, these laws affect
those national origin groups composed of a significant percentage of
immigrants, such as the Latino and Asian communities. At least in the
Southwest, these measures are voted upon primarily with Spanish as the
"competing" language in mind. 9 Designation of English as the official
language, though facially neutral, has a meaningful impact on the Latino
community." In important ways, initiatives dealing with noncitizens are
similar-though facially neutral, they may disparately affect immigrants
from certain countries.
1. The Infamous Alien Land Laws
Facial neutrality is not necessarily a legal prerequisite to the
disadvantaging of noncitizens.91 Consequently, a number of initiatives
have expressly attempted to discriminate against aliens. In Truax v.
Raich,9z for example, Arizona voters passed a measure purportedly
designed to protect U.S. citizens by barring any employer of five or more
employees from employing less than 80% "qualified electors or native-
born citizens." Perhaps concerned more with protecting certain
88. See Juan F. Perea, Demography and Distrust: An Essay on American Languages, Cultural
Pluralism and Official English, 77 Minn. L. Rev. 269, 357-60 (1992) (analyzing regulation of use of
language as proxy for disadvantaging unpopular national origin groups); Antonio J. Califa,
Declaring English the Official Language: Prejudice Spoken Here, 24 Harv. C.IL-C.L. L. Rev. 293
(1989) (analyzing similar themes); see also Mar J. Matsuda, Voices of America: Accent,
Antidiscrimination Law, and a Jurisprudence for the Last Reconstruction, 101) Yale L.J. 1329 (1991)
(analyzing application of antidiscrimination law to accent discrimination, which may mask ethnic
animus).
89. See Perea, supra note 88, at 316-23 (discussing English-Only movements in California and
New Mexico). Some localities have passed versions of English-Only laws in response to the growth
of other linguistic and national origin minorities, such as Southeast Asians. See id. at 344.
90. See Yniguez, 42 F.3d at 1241 ("[IThe adverse impact [of the Arizona English-Only law's]
overbreadth is especially egregious because it is not uniformly spread over the population, but falls
almost entirely upon Hispanics and other national origin minorities.") (citatio as omitted), petitionfor
reh 'g en banc granted, 53 F.3d 1084 (9th Cir. 1995).
91. See infra text accompanying notes 159-60 (discussing lawfulness of alienage classifications).
In a manner reminiscent of the English-Only laws, initiatives sometimes have indirectly reflected
responses to the influx of immigrants. See, eg., Pierce v. Society of Sister, 268 U.S. 510 (1925)
(invalidating initiative responding to immigration into Oregon of Catholics, who frequently attended
parochial schools, by requiring children to attend public schools); see also Meyer v. Nebraska, 262
U.S. 390 (1923) (invalidating law passed by Nebraska legislature, inspired by German immigration,
barring teaching any language other than English in private elementary schools).
92. 239 U.S. 33, 35 (1915).
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constitutional values than with protecting minorities, the Supreme Court
invalidated the measure.93
One of the most well-known types of state laws directed at
noncitizens, at least before Proposition 187, were the alien land laws. A
number of states, including California and Washington, early in the
twentieth century passed laws that barred the ownership of certain real
property by aliens ineligible for citizenship.94 The history and the context
of the 1920 version of California's alien land law, which was passed by
initiative, make it clear that the measure was directed at the Japanese,
one of the groups of immigrants ineligible for citizenship at the time."
Despite the fact that racial animus motivated passage of the laws, the
Supreme Court let them stand.96
That is not to say that there might not be any legitimate concerns with
alien ownership of property.97 Such concerns, however, were not the ones
that carried the day. Consider the blatantly anti-Japanese campaign
waged by supporters of the alien land initiative in California.98 Justice
Murphy described its essence:
93. The Court arguably was more interested in protecting the substantive due process
jurisprudence of Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), than the rights of noncitizens. See Truax
v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33, 41 (1915) (emphasizing that state could not deny noncitizens "the right to
work for a living in the common occupations of the community [which] is of the very essence of the
personal freedom and opportunity that it was the purpose of the [14th] Amendment to secure")
(citations omitted); see also Tribe, supra note 36, § 16-23, at 1546 n.17 (stating that decision "seems
understandable as an expression of Lochner-em solicitude for the employer's liberty of property and
contract").
94. See Cockrill v. California, 268 U.S. 258 (1925) (upholding California law); Frick v. Webb,
263 U.S. 326 (1923) (same); Webb v. O'Brien, 263 U.S. 313 (1923) (same); Porterfield v. Webb,
263 U.S. 225 (1923) (same); Terrace v. Thompson, 263 U.S. 197 (1923) (upholding Washington
law). But ef Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633 (1948) (holding that California law was invalid as
applied to deny ownership of property to citizen because his parents were Japanese citizens
ineligible for naturalization); Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm'n, 334 U.S. 410 (1948) (striking
down on equal protection grounds California statute barring issuance of commercial fishing license
to persons ineligible for citizenship). See generally Dudley 0. McGovney, The Anti-Japanese Land
Laws of California and Ten Other States, 35 Cal. L. Rev. 7 (1947); Edwin E. Ferguson, The
California Alien Land Law and the Fourteenth Amendment, 35 Cal. L. Rev. 61 (1947). The
California Supreme Court invalidated its state's version of the law on federal equal protection
grounds in 1952, after it had been in place for over three decades. See Sei Fujii v. State, 242 P.2d
617 (Cal. 1952); see also Namba v. McCourt, 204 P.2d 569 (Or. 1949) (invalidating Oregon alien
land law on equal protection grounds).
95. See Oyama, 332 U.S. at 635 n.3; Sei Fujii, 242 P.2d at 628.
96. See supra note 94 (citing cases).
97. See Fred L. Morrison & Kenneth P. Krause, State and Federal Legal Regulation ofAlien and
Corporate Land Ownership and Farm Operation 59-60 (1975) (summarizing briefly arguments for
and against regulation of ownership of farm land by noncitizens).
98. See Bruce A. Castleman, California's Alien Land Laws, 7 W. Legal Hist. 25, 41 (1994)
(describing initiative campaign); Ferguson, supra note 94, at 62-73 (reviewing anti-Japanese animus
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A spirited campaign was waged to secure popular approval, a
campaign with a bitter anti-Japanese flavor. All the propaganda
devices then known-newspapers, speeches, films, pamphlets,
leaflets, billboards, and the like-were utilized to spread the anti-
Japanese poison. The Japanese were depicted as degenerate
mongrels and the voters were urged to save "California-the White
Man's Paradise" from the "yellow peril," .... Claims were made
that the birth rate of the Japanese was so high that the white people
would eventually be replaced and dire warnings were made that the
low standard of living of the Japanese endangered the economic
and social health of the community. Opponents of the initiative
measure were labeled "Jap-lovers." The fires of racial animosity
were thus rekindled and the flames rose to new heights."
Justice Murphy's observations show that both raci;t and economic
considerations influenced California voters in passing the alien land
law." In Madison's terms, both "passion" and "self-iriterest" poisoned
the process. As we shall see, similar factors influenced the passage of
Proposition 187.
2. Proposition 187 as Racist?
Though more subtle in light of modem sensibilities, the Proposition
187 campaign bore some striking similarities to the campaign
culminating in the passage of the alien land laws in California. The
question whether the initiative might properly be classified as "racist,"
however, is deeply complicated. Part of its support may result from
that motivated initiative's passage); see also Takahashi, 334 U.S. 410, 422-27 (1948) (Murphy, J.,
concurring) (detailing how California statute barring issuance of commercial fishing licenses to
persons ineligible for citizenship was "but one more manifestation of the anti-Japanese fever which
has been evident in California in varying degrees since the turn of the century').
99. Oyama, 332 U.S. at 658-59 (Murphy, J., concurring) (footnote omitted); see also Terrace v.
Thompson, 274 F. 841, 849 (W.D. Cal. 1921) ("It is obvious that the objection on the part of
Congress [to naturalization of Japanese] is not due to color, as color, but only to color as an evidence
of a type of civilization which it characterizes. The yellow or brown racial color is the hall-mark of
Oriental despotisms, or was at the time the naturalization law was enacted.'), affd, 263 U.S. 197
(1923).
100. See McGovney, supra note 94, at 49 (quoting California Attorney General's Brief to the
California Supreme Court in Frick v. Webb: "It was the purpose of [California Alien Land Law] to
prohibit the enjoyment or possession of, or dominion over, the agricultural lanes of the State by aliens
ineligible to citizenship,--in a practical way to prevent ruinous competition by the Oriental farmer
against the American farmer.') (emphasis added); Sei Fujii v. State, 242 P.2d 617, 628 (Cal. 1952)
("[T]he real purpose of the legislation was the elimination of competition by at en Japanese in farming
California land.').
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concerns with the fiscal consequences of undocumented immigration.
Such a motive is not necessarily suspect."°' Some voters undoubtedly
were fearful of a loss of control of their culture, society, and lives. 2
Others, however, were motivated by a desire to halt the flow of Mexicanimmigrants to the United States and to hasten their return to Mexico.
Others were unabashedly anti-Mexican, regardless of the immigration
status of the persons. It also is possible that the passage of Proposition
187 resulted from sheer frustration with immigration. 3 All this said, we
shall see that it is difficult to refute the claim that the ethnicity of the
stereotypical undocumented immigrant"° played at least some role in the
passage of Proposition 187.
Nativist and racist undertones to the Proposition 187 campaign
suggest that passion, so feared by Madison, influenced the voters. Self-
interest, another of Madison's fears, swayed the electorate as well. Such
factors, of course, also culminated in the alien land laws. In addition,
there are similarities of purpose between the land laws and Proposition
187. Both, at least in part, were designed to discourage immigration into
the state of outsiders undesirable to the majority. 5 Because the federal
government has exclusive control over the regulation of immigration,
101. However, the desire to reduce spending on benefits to immigrants to maintain a larger piece
of the benefit and services pie offered by government (or to stabilize or reduce taxes) may implicate
the self-interest that troubled Madison about direct democracy. See supra text accompanying notes
64-70. Thus, self-interest and passion may have worked in combination to ensure the passage of
Proposition 187. See infra text accompanying notes 108-54 (discussing evidence of racism and
nativism motivating initiative's victory).
102. See Peter H. Schuck, The Message of 187, Am. Prospect, Spring 1995, at 85 (stating belief
that passage of Proposition 187 "is less a spasm of nativist hatred than an expression of public
frustration with a government and civil society that seem out of touch and out of control. .. .').
103. See Magleby, supra note 7, at 30-31 (explaining that voter frustration may have influenced
increase in initiative activity); see also Cain, supra note 75, at 23-24 (contending that passage of some
recent initiatives represents reaction of middle-class white voters to increased representation of
minorities in legislatures).
104. I refer to the stereotypical undocumented immigrant as being from Mexico. Despite the
stereotype, it is undisputable that the undocumented population in the United States is far from
monolithic. It has been estimated that, as of October 1992, less than 40% of the undocumented
persons in the United States are from Mexico. See infra note 148.
105. Compare Estate of Yano, 206 P. 995, 1001 (Cal. 1922) (stating that one purpose of law was
to "discourage the coming of Japanese into this state") and McGovney, supra note 94, at 51 ("The
... real purpose of the California 'ineligible alien' land law was to make the residence of Japanese in
the state as little attractive as possible. Since the state lacked constitutional power to drive them
across its borders by direct legislation, the attempt was made to approximate that objective by
indirection.") with California Ballot Pamphlet, supra note 20, at 54 (reprinting arguments by
Proposition 187 supporters including statement that initiative "will be the first giant stride in
ultimately ending the ILLEGAL ALIEN invasion") (capitals in original).
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both the alien land laws and Proposition 187 arguably are preempted."°
Consistent with the view that both impinged upon distinctively federal
concerns, the land laws and Proposition 187 provoked hostile responses
from the governments whose nationals were affected and thus impacted
U.S. foreign relations. °7
a. The Campaign for the Initiative
At the risk of understatement, California experienced a spirited, hotly
contested campaign over Proposition 187. Nativist and racist as well as
economic, social, and cultural themes arose in the campaign." 8 Governor
Pete Wilson, up for re-election, capitalized on public dissatisfaction with
immigration by ardently supporting the initiative. Some of his campaign
advertisements showed shadowy Mexicans crossing the border in large
numbers."° This was not the governor's first foray into immigration
politics in the 1990s. By arguing that pregnant women unlawfully
106. See Toll v. Moreno, 458 U.S. 1, 10-17 (1982) (holding that state could not place additional
burdens on noncitizens not contemplated by Congress); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 378
(1971) ("State laws that restrict the eligibility of aliens for welfare benefits merely because of their
alienage conflict with... overriding national policies in an area constitutionally entrusted to the
Federal Government.'); see also Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633, 649-50 (1948) (Black, J.,
concurring) (contending that California's alien land law was preempted). But cf DeCanas v. Bica,
424 U.S. 351 (1976) (holding that California law barring employment of undocumented persons was
not preempted).
107. Compare Oyama, 332 U.S. at 655-56 & n.7 (Murphy, J., concurring) (acknowledging
Japanese government's hostile response to passage of California's alien land law) with Tim Golden,
The 1994 Campaign: Mexico; Government Joins Attack on Ballot Idea, N.Y. Times, Nov. 3, 1994, at
A29 (reporting that Mexican president criticized Proposition 187 and "nenophobic campaign"
culminating in its passage) and Mark Fineman, California Election: Mexico Assails State's Passage
of Prop. 187, L.A. Times, Nov. 10, 1994, at A28 (reporting that Mexican president stated that
Proposition 187 was "racist" and "a disgrace for U.S.-Mexican relations'). There also were reports
of anti-American violence in Mexico after Proposition 187's passage and a call by some Mexicans to
boycott California businesses. See Tod Robberson, Salinas, Other Mexicans Protest California Anti-
Immigrant Vote, Wash. Post, Nov. 10, 1994, at A49. Leaders of a number of ]'atin American nations
besides Mexico also attacked Proposition 187. See William Booth, Latin Leaders Criticize Growing
U.S. Nativism, Wash. Post, Dec. 10, 1994, at A6.
108. Cf. Aleinikoff, Martin, & Motomura, supra note 30, at 2 (noting that so-called Chinese
exclusion laws of late 1800s "like many later immigration laws-were the product of economic and
political concerns laced with racism and nativism").
109. See John Marelius, Wilson Ad Out to Ease Prop. 187 Drumbeat, San Diego Union-Trib.,
Oct. 25, 1994, at A3 (reporting that Governor Pete Wilson's advertisement "showed blurry black-
and-white footage of people dodging cars as they dash through the San Ysidro border crossing ...
[accompanied by) pulsating cop-show-style music and an announcer who menacingly intones, 'They
keep coming."); John Jacobs, The Sleazy Ads on Proposition 187, San Diego Union-Trib., Nov. 4,
1994, at BI I (reporting that Wilson campaign advertisement showed Mexican immigrants coming
the "wrong way" to United States by "swimming across the Rio Grande or dodging cars on the
freeway at the border entrance").
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immigrate to this country to secure free medical care and to give their
children U.S. citizenship, Wilson previously had attacked the provision
of public assistance to the undocumented." °
But it was seldom the case during the campaign that Mexicans were
singled out among the undocumented population. Undocumentedimmigrants as a group were blamed for California's fiscal and other
woes, as the initiative's "Save Our State" moniker suggests."' The fact
that Proposition 187 placed in jeopardy federal funding of $15 billion, an
amount that dwarfed any potential savings, was virtually ignored in the
campaign."' That fact alone suggested that other factors besides a desire
to save money were at work."
3
Some supporters of Proposition 187 expressed hopes and aims well
beyond simply fiscal ones. One of the initiative sponsors, Ron Prince,
baldly asserted that "'[i]llegal aliens are killing us in California ....
Those who support illegal immigration are, in effect, anti-American.""' 4
One argument in support of Proposition 187 in the voters' pamphlet
suggests the deeply negative feelings about immigration and immigrants:
"Proposition 187 will be the first giant stride in ultimately ending the
ILLEGAL ALIEN invasion."" 5 The Proposition 187 media director for
southern California expressed even more disturbing concerns:
Proposition 187 is... a logical step toward saving California from
economic ruin. . . . By flooding the state with 2 million illegal
aliens to date, and increasing that figure each of the following 10
years, Mexicans in California would number 15 million to 20
110. See, e.g., Major Garrett, California Dreaming? Cries for Immigration Relief Shake Nation,
Wash. Times, Aug. 15, 1993, at Al (quoting California Governor Pete Wilson: "'We give people a
reward for violating the law and successfally entering the country illegally .... If you come to this
country illegally and have a baby, the reward is your baby will become a citizen, entitled to all the
rights and perquisites of any American citizen."). Wilson placed a full page advertisement in the
New York Times asking the following question: "'Why does the U.S. government reward illegal
immigrants who successfully violate the law and manage to have a child born on U.S. soil?"'
Suzanne Espinosa, Attacks by White Supremacists, S.F. Chron., Aug. 13, 1993, at Al (quoting
advertisement).
Ill. See, e.g., California Ballot Pamph!et, supra note 20, at 54 (Argument in Favor of
Proposition 187) ("It has been estimated that ILLEGAL ALIENS are costing taxpayers in excess of
5 billion dollars a year ... While our own citizens and legal residents go wanting, those who choose
to enter our country ILLEGALLY get royal treatment at the expense of the California taxpayer....
IT IS TIME THIS STOPS!") (capitals in original).
112. See California Ballot Pamphlet, supra note 20, at 50-53.
113. See Johnson, supra note 21 (exploring this theme).
114. See Patrick J. McDonnell, Prop. 187 Turns Up Heat in U.S. Immigration Debate, L.A.
Times, Aug. 10, 1994, at Al (quoting Ronald Prince, co-sponsor of Proposition 187).
115. California Ballot Pamphlet, supra note 20, at 54 (capitals in original).
Washington Law Review Vol. 70:629, 1995
million by 2004. During those 10 years about 5 million to 8 million
Californians would have emigrated to other states. If these trends
continued, a Mexico-controlled California could vote to establish
Spanish as the sole language of California, 10 million more
English-speaking Californians could flee, and there could be a
statewide vote to leave the Union and annex California to
Mexico. 116
b. The Views of the Drafters
The positions of the individuals who composed the committee that
drafted Proposition 187 help one gain a sense of the mixed motives
behind the measure. 7  Ron Prince, whose anti-immigrant animus
apparently grew out of a business dispute with a legal immigrant he later
claimed was an "illegal,"' " conjured up disturbing imagery from another
era in advocating passage of the initiative: "'You are the posse and SOS
is the rope.'. 9 Besides suggesting that Proposition 187 opponents were
"anti-American,"'' 0 Prince linked "illegal aliens" with criminals: "'[t]he
•.. mindset on the part of illegal aliens, is to commit crimes. The first
law they break is to be here illegally. The attitude from then on is, I don't
have to obey your laws." 2'
116. Letter to Editor by Linda R. Hayes, N.Y. Times, Oct. 15, 1994, at A18 (emphasis added); see
Gebe Martinez & Patrick J. McDonnell, Prop. 187 Backers Counting on Message, Not Strategy,
L.A. Times, Oct. 30, 1994, at Al (quoting leaders of anti-immigrant groups, one stating that "'I have
no intention of being the object of 'conquest,' peaceful or otherwise, by Latinos, Asians, blacks,
Arabs or any other group of individuals who have claimed my country"' and another claiming that
undocumented immigration is "'part of a reconquest of the Southwest by foreign Hispanics ....
Someone is going to be leaving the state. It will either be them or us.").
117. See Paul Feldman, Figures Behind Prop. 187 Look at Its Creation, L.A. Times, Dec. 14,
1994, at A3 (reporting that drafting committee included Ron Prince, Harold Ezell (former
Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) official), Alan Nelson (former INS Commissioner),
Barbara Kiley (mayor of Yorba Linda, California), Robert Kiley (political consultant), Richard
Mountjoy (Republican member of California legislature), and Barbara Coe (head of the California
Coalition for Immigration Reform and Citizens for Action Now)).
118. See Gebe Martinez & Doreen Carvajal, Creators of Prop. 187 Largely Escape Spotlight,
L.A. Times, Sept. 4, 1994, at Al (reporting that Prince at one time clairied that he had been
defrauded by a Canadian "illegal alien," who in fact was a lawful permanent resident).
119. George Ramos, Prop. 187 Debate: No Tolerance But Abundant Angel' L.A. Times, Oct. 10,
1994, at B3 (quoting Prince).
120. See supra text accompanying note 114 (quoting Prince).
121. Marc Cooper, The War Against Illegal Immigrants Heats Up, Village Voice, Oct. 4, 1994, at
28 (quoting Prince); see also Johnson, supra note 21 (analyzing frequent lnk in political debate
between immigrant benefit recipient and "criminal alien").
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Well before the advent of Proposition 187, Harold Ezell, Western
Regional Commissioner of the Immigration and Naturalization Service
(INS) in the 1980s, was infamous for comments made about "'illegal
aliens'--that they should be "'caught, skinned and fried."''  Ezell's
statements prompted Latino activists to demand his resignation on the
grounds that he was racist." During the debate over Proposition 187,
Ezell explained that support for the measure was strong because "'[t]he
people are tired of watching their state run wild and become a third
world country. '
' '14
Alan Nelson, former Commissioner of the INS, at one time was a
consultant with the Federation for American Immigration Reform, which
received funding from the Pioneer Fund, a group believing in racial
superiority." Concerned with mass migrations from Mexico," 6 Nelson
resigned his position with the INS in the wake of conflict with the
Attorney General and allegations of poor leadership and inefficiency.
1 27
Richard Mountjoy, a member of the California legislature,
consistently has proposed bills directed at immigrants, many of which
have been bitterly opposed by immigrants' rights activists.22 He has little
122. Olga Briseno, Mister Migra, Harold Ezell, San Diego Union-Trib., Aug. 23, 1989, at F1
(quoting Ezell). Senator Dennis DeConcini reportedly complained to Ezell's superior, INS
Commissioner Alan Nelson, that Ezell used the term "wets," apparently a shortened version of the
pejorative "wetbacks," to refer to immigrants seeking to cross the Rio Grande. See Jay Mathews,
Tough-Talking INS Official Raises Profile, Ire in the West, Wash. Post, Mar. 24, 1986, at A1.
123. See George Ramos, Aty. Gen. Aide Calls Ezell a 'Short-Termer' in His INS Post, L.A.
Times, May 19, 1989, at A3.
124. Daniel B. Wood, Ballot Vote on Illegal Immigrants Set for Fall in California, Christian Sci.
Mon., June 1, 1994, at I (quoting Ezell).
125. See Pamela Burdman, White Supremacist Link Trips Prop. 187, S.F. Chron., Oct. 13, 1994,
at A4.
126. See, e.g., Alan C. Nelson, NAFTA: Immigration Issues Must Be Addressed, 27 U.C. Davis L.
Rev. 987 (1994) (criticizing failure of North American Free Trade Agreement to address
immigration of Mexicans to United States).
127. See Lee May & Ronald J. Ostrow, Bush Replaces Controversial Chief of INS, L.A. Times,
June 27, 1989, at Al (noting reasons for Nelson's resignation and quoting Justice Department
official as stating that Nelson 'has been an increasing embarrassment"); U.S. Gen. Accounting
Office, Immigration Management: Strong Leadership and Management Reforms Needed to Address
Serious Problems (1991); U.S. Gen. Accounting Office, Asylum: Uniform Application of Standards
Uncertain-Few Denied Applicants Deported (1987); see also Maralee Schwartz, Nelson Out at
INS, Wash. Post, June 27, 1989, at A21 (noting that audit of INS revealed that agency spent $1500
for portrait of Nelson, and also produced a videotape tribute to him entitled "The Nelson Years").
128. See, e.g., Senate Bill 1267, California 1995-96 Reg. Sess. (1995) (Mountjoy) (proposing that
state agencies be required to list all costs of preparing materials in languages other than English);
Assembly Bill 24, California 1995-96 Reg. Sess. (1994) (Mountjoy) (proposing to implement
English as official language provision of state constitution by requiring state and local governments
to take steps to preserve, protect, and enhance role of English); Assembly Bill 2434, California
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sympathy for undocumented immigrants. According to Mountjoy,
undocumented mothers "come here for that birth certificate. They come
here to get on the California dole."'129 "'[I]f you want to stop the flow of
illegal aliens to our hospitals, stop the benefits.' ... 'Having a child at
our expense is not an emergency.""' 130 In Mountjoy's eyes, "[t]he people
of California are subsidizing the illegal [alien] invasion to the tune of
somewhere around $5 billion a year," and "[w]hen you have a flood of
immigration... there's not long until this life boat sinks.''
Barbara Kiley, mayor of a city in southern Califmia, reportedly
described the children of undocumented immigrants as "'those little
f-kers." 3'  Kiley and her husband, who is a campaign consultant,
reportedly became involved in the Proposition 187 campaign as "'a
business consideration."" 33 Mr. Kiley reportedly stated that:
1993-94 Reg. Sess. (1994) (Mountjoy) (same); Assembly Joint Resolution 46, California 1993-94
Reg. Sess. (Mountjoy) (1994) (resolving that United States government should negotiate agreements
with countries to which it gives foreign aid that would allow nationals of those countries convicted
of crimes in United States to serve sentences in those countries); Assembly Joint Resolution 49,
California 1993-94 Reg. Sess. (Mountjoy) (1993) (resolving that Corgress should propose
amendments to Constitution limiting citizenship to persons born in United States to mothers who are
citizens or lawful permanent residents); Assembly Bill 12a, California 1993-94 Spec. Sess. "A"
(Mountjoy) (1994) (providing criminal penalties for use of fraudulent documents to conceal
immigration status); Assembly Bill 131a, California 1993-94 Spec. Sess. 'A" (Mountjoy) (1994)
(proposing measures to facilitate deportation of alien felons); Assembly Bill 149, California 1993-
94 Reg. Sess. (1993) (Mountjoy) (proposing prohibition of expenditure of state funds for education
of undocumented aliens); Assembly Bill 150, California 1993-94 Reg. Sess. (1993) (Mountjoy)
(proposing the state funds not be provided to Medi-Cal provider who fails to report to INS
undocumented alien to whom it has provided services); Assembly Bill 151, California 1993-94 Reg.
Sess. (1993) (Mountjoy) (proposing that undocumented aliens not be permitted to receive workers'
compensation); Assembly Bill 2171, California 1993-94 Reg. Sess. (1993) (Mountoy) (requiring
that undocumented alien could not be issued driver's license, or have one renewed); Assembly Bill
2228, California 1993-94 Reg. Sess. (1993) (Mountjoy) (proposing that undocumented aliens be
prohibited from enrolling in any public postsecondary institution).
129. Sonya Live (CNN television broadcast, Feb. 16, 1994) (talk show wi:h Mountjoy answering
questions) [hereinafter Sonya Live]. But see Johnson, supra note 21 (discussing social science
literature refuting claim that availability of public benefits is "magnet" attracting undocumented
immigrants to United States).
130. Major Garrett, Economic Plan Includes Aliens'Medical Funds, Wash. Times, July 14, 1993,
at Al (quoting Mountoy) (emphasis added).
131. Sonya Live, supra note 129.
132. Elizabeth Kadetsky, Bashing Illegals in California: 'Save Our State' Initiative, Nation, Oct.
17, 1994, at 416, 418 (quoting Kiley).
133. Paul Feldman, Figures Behind Prop. 187 Lookat Its Creation, L.A. Times, Dec. 14, 1994, at
A3 (quoting Harold Ezell). A group hoping to place an initiative similar to Proposition 187 on the
ballot in Florida later hired Robert Kiley as a consultant. See Greg Hemande;, Prop. 187 Adviser To
Help Florida Groups, L.A. Times, Dec. 15, 1994, at BI.
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I don't mean to be inhumane, but this [undocumented] woman
[seeking medical care] is a perfect example of why we need Prop.
187 .... She has already had two children here and now she's on
her third, and she doesn't even belong here. All I can say is, these
people are going to have to go back home. We're paying for her
care while Americans are homeless and starving in the streets.'34
Opining that those protesting Proposition 187 damaged their cause,
Kiley stated that "'[o]n TV there was nothing but Mexican flags and
brown faces."" 3
The public statements of one Proposition 187 drafter, Barbara Coe, a
committed anti-immigrant activist, are worthy of special attention.'36
Coe's anti-immigrant crusade began after she visited a social service
office where many different languages were being spoken. During that
visit, Coe allegedly learned that undocumented persons were eligible for
benefits for which Coe's citizen friend was not.' Based on her personal
experiences, Coe has contended that undocumented immigrants "are
endangering, not only our financial system, but they... hold, not only
our laws, . . . but our language, our culture, and our very history in
contempt . . . .'"" One of her fears stems from the belief that the
"'militant arm of the pro-illegal activists ... have vowed to take over
first California, then the Western states and then the rest of the
nation."""
In Coe's mind, "illegal aliens" and crime are inextricably linked:
You get illegal alien children, Third World children, out of our
schools, and you will reduce the violence. That is a fact .... You're
not dealing with a lot of shiny face, little kiddies . . . . You're
dealing with Third World cultures who come in, they shoot, they
beat, they stab and they spread their drugs around in our school
system. And we're paying them to do it. 40
134. Sara Catania, County Report: A Message Hits Home, L.A. Times, Nov. 20, 1994, at BI
(quoting Robert Kiley).
135. Margot Homblower, Making andBreaking Law, Time, Nov. 21, 1994, at 68 (quoting Kiley).
136. Coe is not the first woman at the forefront of an anti-immigrant movement. See Margaret K.
Holden, Gender and Protest Ideology: Sue Ross Keenan and the Oregon Anti-Chinese Movement, 7
W. Legal Hist. 223 (1994) (describing role of Sue Ross Keenan in anti-Chinese agitation in Oregon
in the late 1800s).
137. See Martinez & Carvajal, supra note 118.
138. Sonya Live, supra note 129 (talk show with Barbara Coe).
139. Carol Byrne, Proposition 187"s Uproar, Star Trib., Oct. 20, 1994, at 7A (quoting Coe).
140. Pamela J. Podger & Michael Doyle, War of Words, Fresno Bee, Jan. 9, 1994, at Al (quoting
Coe).
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In an op/ed piece, Coe explored a similar theme: "Violent crime is
rampant. Illegal-alien gangs roam our streets, dealing drugs and
searching for innocent victims to rob, rape and, in many cases, murder
those who dare violate their 'turf.... [N]early 90% of all illicit drugs
are brought here by illegals ....
c. Election Results
When the initiative in question is facially neutral, it is difficult to
determine how significant race and ethnicity were in the law's approval
through the electoral process. This is true with respect to Proposition
187, even though the motives of the drafters appear less than pristine.
Consider some quantitative evidence. Three of the five counties with
the highest percentages of votes favoring the initiative had non-Hispanic
white populations in excess of 60%; the two counties that registered the
greatest opposition to Proposition 187 had non-Hispanic white
populations of 45.3% or less. 43 Exit polling reflects that the vote was
141. Barbara Coe, Keep Illegals Out of State, USA Today, Oct. 12, 1994, at 12A. One of the
organizations that Coe heads placed the following advertisement in the National Review that plays
on similar themes:
WANTED: TESTIMONY FROM U.S. citizens who have been victims of ,imes either financial
(welfare, unemployment, food stamps, etc.), educational (overcrowding, forced bilingual
classes, etc.) or physical (rape, robbery, assault, infectious disease, etc.) committed by illegal
aliens. Legal advice welcome-possible lawsuit pending.
National Rev., July 5, 1993, at 60.
142. See infra text accompanying notes 155-95 (analyzing difficulties encountered in attempting
to prove voters' discriminatory intent necessEry to prevail on equal protection challenge to intiative).
143. In tabular form:
Top Five Proposition 187 Counties:
County For 187 Against 187 Non-Hispanic White
Population
Colusa 77.2% (3,878) 22.8% (1,143) 43.1% (7,018)
Glenn 76.8% (6,044) 23.2% (1,830) 65.4% (16,218)
Tehama 75.1% (13,914) 24.9% (4,605) 81.5% (40,469)
Sutter 75.1% (16,623) 24.9% (5,515) 6D.4% (38,929)
Madera 75.1% (20,151) 24.9% (6,694) 37.4% (32,969)
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racially polarized, particularly along white-Latino lines. White voters
supported the proposition at about a two-to-one ratio while Latinos
overwhelmingly opposed it by over a three-to-one margin.14 The
landslide victory of Proposition 187 surprised many because polls before
the election projected that the vote would be much closer and that the
measure might even fail. 145 This might be explained by the fact that some
white supporters, fearing being classified as "racists," were not truthful
with pollsters, a common occurrence in racially polarized elections.146
Bottom Five Proposition 187 Counties:
County For 187 Against 187 Non-Hispanic White
Population
San Francisco 29.3% (69,313) 70.7% (167,473) 39.7% (287,066)
Alameda 40.4% (160,367) 59.6% (236,910) 45.3% (580,010)
Main 41.3% (43,284) 58.7% (61,606) 80.9% (186,198)
Santa Cruz 47.2% (43,261) 52.8% (48,351) 63.6% (146,052)
San Mateo 47.4% (101,786) 52.6% (113,134) 54.2% (352,258)
Vote tabulations are from Statement of Vote, supra note 18, at 113-15. Percentages are rounded to
the closest 0.1%. Population information is from California Cities, Towns, & Counties: Basic Data
Profiles for All Municipalities and Counties 467-524 (Edith Homor ed., 1993). Non-white Hispanic
figures were calculated by subtracting the Hispanic from the white population. See id. at viii.
There obviously are many other factors influencing the vote breakdown that go unexplored here,
including but not limited to disparities between rural-urban voters, percentage of each demographic
group who are citizens and thus eligible to vote, and areas of great migration in recent years.
144. See Times Poll/A Look at the Electorate, L.A. Times, Nov. 10, 1994, at B2 (describing exit
poll results reflecting following breakdown of those in various groups who voted for/against
Proposition 187: white (63-37%), black (47-53%), Latino (23-77%), Asian (47-53%)); see also
Raymond E. Wolfinger & Fred L Greenstein, The Repeal of Fair Housing in California: An Analysis
of Referendum Voting, 62 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 753, 768-69 (1968) (concluding that, because
plebiscites preclude compromise between various interest groups, they polarize voters on issues of
race). See generally Samuel Issacharoff, Polarized Voting and the Political Process: The
Transformation of Voting Rights Jurisprudence, 90 Mich. L. Rev. 1833 (1992) (analyzing increasing
inquiry by courts into racial polarization of voting results in evaluating claims under Voting Rights
Act).
145. See, e.g., Ed Mendel, "The Door Is Open" If Voters Kill 187, Co-Author Warns, San Diego
Union-Trib., Nov. 4, 1994, at Al (reporting that polls showed that Proposition 187 vote was dead
heat).
146. As Professor Baker has observed in the context of elections polarized along black-white
lines:
It is a commonplace [phenomenon] of modem American politics that pre-election and exit polls
systematically overstate the proportion of the vote that the black candidate in a racially mixed
election will actually receive. A popular and plausible interpretation of this persistent finding is
that (typically white) individuals are more willing to vote against the black candidate than to
admit publicly that they will or did; that is, individuals are more often willing to be "racists"
than to risk beingperceived as such.
Baker, supra note 16, at 734 (emphasis in original) (footnotes omitted).
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d. A "Motivating Factor": Immigrants from Mexico
Like the alien land laws, Proposition 187, though facially neutral, was
directed at immigrants from a certain country. The drafters' comments
make clear that the "illegal aliens" at the forefront in their minds were
undocumented Mexican immigrants.147 Although there are many other
undocumented persons in the United States other than Mexicans,' this
never figured prominently in the debate over the initiative. Moreover, the
implementation of Proposition 187 would have-and indeed its passage
already has had-impacts on discrete ethnic communities.
Undocumented Mexicans, Mexican-American citizens, and citizens of
other minority groups viewed as foreign, such as Asian-Americans, are
the groups most likely to suffer the initiative's stin 149 Not surprisingly,
Latino and Asian ethnic organizations voiced the strongest opposition in
the Proposition 187 campaign.5 People with names such as Alan Nelson
and Ron Prince, for rather obvious reasons, are unlikely to be suspected
of being undocumented immigrants. Rather, those with names such as
Perez and Chung will be the more likely suspects.1
5
'
Some of the anti-Mexican undertones to Proposition 187 came to
fruition after the election.5 2  Some Latinos reported harassment,
147. See supra text accompanying notes 117-41.
148. See Statistics Division, Immigration and Naturalization Service, Estimates of the
Unauthorized Immigrant Population Residing in the United States, By Courtry of Origin and State
of Residence: October 1992, at 14 (Apr. 29, 1994) (estimating that, as of Cctober 1992, only 39%
(1.3 million) of approximately 3.4 million undocumented persons in United States were from
Mexico); see also INS 1993 Statistical Yearbook, supra note 45, at 182-83 (analyzing this estimate).
149. At least two deaths-an elderly Chinese woman and a Mexican child-have been attributed
to their fear of seeking medical care because of Proposition 187's passage. See Lee Romney, Boy in
Prop. 187 Controversy Mourned, L.A. Times, Nov. 29, 1994, at A22; Pamela Burdman, Woman
Wo Feared Prop. 187 Deportation Dies at &F. General, S.F. Chron., Nov. 26, 1994, at A14. It has
been reported that undocumented persons fear seeking health care. See Patrick J. McDonnell & Julie
Marquis, Clinics See Fewer Patients After Prop. 187, L.A. Times, Nov. 26, 1994, at Al; Fearful
Aliens in California Staying Away from Clinics, N.Y. Times, Nov. 12, 1994, at A9.
150. See Lawyers Readying Strategy Against Proposition 187, Recorder (San Francisco), Oct. 20,
1994, at 7 (reporting that, even before its passage, Mexican American D.gal Defense Fund and
others were preparing to challenge initiativ); K. Connie Kang, California Elections/Proposition
187; Asian American Groups Organize to Fight Measure, L.A. Times, Oct 9, 1994, at B1 (reporting
that grassroots movement of diverse Asian-American communities joined in opposing Proposition
187).
151. See Johnson, supra note 21 (analyzing concerns in this regard).
152. See, e.g., Paul Feldman & Jon Garcia, California ElectionsPropo.ition 187, L.A. Times,
Nov. 8, 1994, at A3 (reporting that at Southern California high schools stickers bearing a swastika
and stating ."stop non-white immigration"' were posted throughout campus).
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including racial epithets and being told to go back to Mexico. 53 A
founder of a group in Arizona seeking to place a Proposition 187-type
initiative on the ballot in that state denied that it was a racial issue: "My
friends have never heard a racist word out of me. I just don't like
wetbacks."154
C. The Equal Protection Difficulties Faced in Testing the Lawfulness
of Popular Democratic Action
In light of the fact that immigrants are discrete and insular
minorities,155 and considering Madison's fear that a plebiscite might
enable voters to act impulsively due to passion and self-interest, 156 the
passage of Proposition 187 is not particularly surprising. Immigrants,
who are lawfully disenfranchised, arguably are undeserving of any
special constitutional protections. 57 This argument carries particular
force with respect to undocumented immigrants in the country in
violation of the law. The Supreme Court, however, consistently has held
that noncitizens physically present in the country, whether their status is
lawful or not, enjoy certain constitutional rights. 5 It therefore is not
153. See, e.g., Thomas D. Elias, Fear, Insults Increase After Prop. 187 Vote, Ariz. Republic, Dec.
10, 1994, at A31 (offering examples); 187"s Vigilante "Enforcers" Christian Sci. Mon., Dec. 27,
1994, at 19 (same). National Public Radio broadcast a tape recording of a call received by a
immigrants' rights group after passage of Proposition 187:
Hasta la vista, you [expletive deleted] Mexicans. You're gettin' out of the [expletive deleted]
damned country once and for all. We're sick and tired of your [expletive deleted] damned
Spanish speaking [expletive deleted]. If we go to your country, we couldn't become a [expletive
deleted] damned citizen. You son of a [expletive deleted] think you run this [expletive deleted]
country. I got news for you. You're outta here, wetback. Adios, mother.
Morning Edition: Prop. 187 Causing Problems Despite Court Restraint (National Public Radio
broadcast, Nov. 29, 1994).
154. Maria Puente, States Setting Stage for Their Own Prop. 187s, USA Today, Nov. 18, 1994, at
3A (emphasis added).
155. See John Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust: A Theory of Judicial Review 161-62 (1980);
Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372 (1971); Toll v. Moreno, 458 U.S. 1, 20 (1982) (Blackmun,
J., concurring). This is true even though immigration status is not an immutable characteristic. See
Ely, supra, at 154-55.
156. See supra text accompanying notes 61-74.
157. See Tribe, supra note 36, § 16-23, at 1545.
158. See, e.g., Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 210-16 (1982) (equal protection rights); Yamataya v.
Fisher (The Japanese Immigrant Case), 189 U.S. 86 (1903) (due process rights). The rights of
noncitizens not within the country, or halted at the border before entry, are much more
circumscribed. See Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 32 (1982) (emphasizing that the Supreme
Court "has long held that an alien seeking initial admission to the United States . . . has no
constitutional rights regarding his application, for the power to admit or exclude aliens is a sovereign
prerogative7).
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tenable, at least at this time in our constitutional history, to claim that the
majority can have its way with immigrants.
Despite finding that aliens generally enjoy some rights under the
Constitution, the Supreme Court has held that, unlike those based on
race, classifications based on immigration status-at least by the federal
government-generally are not "suspect" and thus are not subject to
strict scrutiny. 59 This doctrinal characteristic makes :t less likely that
federal, rather than state, alienage classifications will bie found to violate
equal protection. State laws making alienage classifications, however, at
times have been invalidated, though the Court has been less than
consistent in this regard."6
Suppose that immigrants' rights advocates desired to assert an equal
protection claim that Proposition 187 discriminates not only on the basis
of alienage status, but also on account of the ethnicity of the immigrants
at whom it was directed. Such a claim would capture the flavor of some
of the most deeply-held objections to the measure. Thisl section analyzes
two doctrinal problems that would arise in prevailing on an equal
protection claim of this nature. 6
1. Proving a Discriminatory Intent
One equal protection challenge to Proposition 187 might be that,
though facially neutral, it will have a discriminatory impact on
immigrants and citizens of particular ethnicities and national origin
groups. Significant evidence could be adduced to support this position.
Nonetheless, a major obstacle to any such claim would be the Supreme
Court's equal protection jurisprudence. Over the last twenty years, the
Court has made it clear that the showing of a racially disproportionate
impact alone is insufficient to establish that a facially neutral law violates
the Equal Protection Clause. 62 Rather, even for legislation adopted
159. See Plyler, 457 U.S. at 216-24; see also infra note 187 (noting difference in treatment in
Supreme Court review of alienage classifications by state and federal governments). But cf Hampton
v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88 (1976) (holding unconstitutional federal regulation barring
noncitizens from employment in federal competitive civil service).
160. See supra text accompanying note 36.
161. This section does not address the question whether the discriminatory application of
Proposition 187 would be unlawful. It is undisputable that this would violate the Constitution. See
Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886). Instead, this section focuses on whether the initiative can
be challenged on equal protection grounds because it was passed for discriminatory reasons and may
well have a discriminatory impact.
162. See, e.g., Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 255,
264-65 (1977) (finding that rezoning denial for racially integrated low- and moderate-income
housing in community in which only 27 of 64,000 residents were black did not violate equal
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through initiative, the aggrieved party must establish that the law was
enacted with a discriminatory intent.163 Such an intent can be proven
through circumstantial evidence,'" including a "racially disproportionate
effect. '165 Still, intent is difficult to prove, clearly more so than simply
protection clause); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976) (holding that fact that black
applicants failed verbal skills examination for position with police department at four times the rate
of whites was insufficient to establish an equal protection violation); see also Daniel R. Ortiz, The
Myth ofIntent in Equal Protection, 41 Stan. L. Rev. 1105, 1118 (1989) ("After the [Supreme] Court
made clear that racial... classifications would receive heightened scrutiny ... governments tried to
circumvent equal protection by discriminating by proxy. Instead of facially discriminating against a
racial group, for example, the state would facially discriminate on the basis of a different
characteristic that happened to correlate with race.").
163. See, eg., Washington v. Seattle Sch. Dist., 458 U.S. 457,484-85 (1982); Crawford v. Board
of Educ., 458 U.S. 527, 537 (1982).
The discriminatory intent requirement has been criticized. See, e.g., Tribe, supra note 36, § 16-20;
Alan D. Freeman, Legitimizing Racial Discrimination Through Antidiscrimination Law. A Critical
Review of Supreme Court Doctrine, 62 Minn. L. Rev. 1049, 1114-18 (1978); Theodore Eisenberg,
Disproportionate Impact and Illicit Motive: Theories of Constitutional Adjudication, 52 N.Y.U. L.
Rev. 36 (1977); Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with
Unconscious Racism, 39 Stan. L. Rev. 317 (1987).
The equal protection clauses of certain states have been interpreted more expansively to allow a
violation in certain circumstances to be predicated upon a showing of discriminatory impact. See
Peter L. Reich, Greening the Ghetto: A Theory of Environmental Race Discrimination, 41 Kan. L.
Rev. 271,301-05 (1992) (summarizing case law).
164. See, eg., Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222 (1985) (invalidating provision of Alabama
constitution disenfranchising persons convicted of crimes of "moral turpitude" because it was clearly
designed to disenfranchise African-Americans); Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613 (1982) (holding that
history of discrimination and a continuing governmental unresponsiveness to minority interests may
support finding that discriminatory intent motivated maintenance of at-large electoral scheme);
Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 266-68 (emphasizing that discriminatory intent analysis requires
"sensitive inquiry into such circumstantial and direct evidence of intent as may be available" and
analysis of various types of evidence, including disproportionate impact, historical background,
departures from ordinary procedure, legislative or administrative history, and contemporaneous
statements of members of the decisionmaking body); United States v. Yonkers Bd. of Educ., 837
F.2d 1181 (2d Cir. 1987) (holding that evidence demonstrated that city had engaged in intentional
racial segregation in subsidized housing and public schools); see also Alan E. Brownstein, Illicit
Legislative Motive in the Municipal Land Use Regulation Process, 57 U. Cin. L. Rev. 1, 44-46, 74-
77, 110-14 (1988) (acknowledging difficulties entailed in attempting to establish invidious motive in
municipal land use decisions but offering examples in which burden had been satisfied); cf Church
of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 113 S. Ct. 2217, 2227 (1993) (acknowledging
that, even if a law is neutral on its face, it may be invalid if purpose is to restrict activity because
practice is performed for religious reasons); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 58-60 (1985) (holding
that only conceivable purpose for Alabama law permitting prayer in schools was endorsement of
religion).
165. Crawford, 458 U.S. at 544; see Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976)
("[D]iscriminatory purpose may often be inferred from the totality of the relevant facts, including the
fact, if it is true, that the law bears more heavily on one race than another."); see also Reitman v.
Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369, 373 (1967) (striking down on equal protection grounds, before advent of
intent requirement, initiative that barred state from restricting private real property owners' right to
sell, lease, or rent property on discriminatory grounds by taking into account "'immediate objective,'
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establishing a disparate impact on a minority group. Consequently, the
intent requirement has deterred the filing of equal protection challenges
to governmental action.
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Intent analysis raises a variety of problems that are especially acute in
evaluating lawmaking by initiative. 167  Obviously, the larger the
institution making the challenged decision, the more difficult it is to
establish an invidious intent. For example, although it is difficult to
determine the intent of a seven-member city council, it is even more so
with respect to a 535-member legislative body, such as Congress. 6 ' A
variety of motives may influence a legislator's voting decision, and a
legislative decision to act necessarily is a mixed bag of the intents of
many different legislators. The difficulties of such an exercise are
its 'ultimate effect' and its 'historical context and the conditions existing yrior to its enactment");
Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. at 253 (Stevens, J., concurring) (emphasizing that impact of allegedly
discriminatory practice is best evidence of intent and that "[i]t is unrealistic, on the one hand, to
require the victim of alleged discrimination to uncover the actual subjective intent of the
decisionmaker or, conversely, to invalidate otherwise legitimate action simply because an improper
motive affected the deliberation of a participant in the decisional process').
166. See Theodore Eisenberg & Sheri L. Johnson, The Effects of Intent: 1)o We Know How Legal
Standards Work?, 76 Cornell L. Rev. 1151, 1153 (1991) (opining, based on results of empirical
study, that "[t]he Supreme Court's [intent] standard takes its toll not through an unusually high loss
rate for those plaintiffs reaching trial or appeal, but by deterring victims from even filing claims').
167. See Eule, supra note 16, at 1562 (recognizing difficulties and advocating relaxation of intent
requirement in scrutinizing lawmaking by initiative).
168. See Brownstein, supra note 164, at 46-47 (analyzing problems of determining motives of
legislative bodies). The Supreme Court once emphasized that:
Inquiries into congressional motives or purposes are a hazardous matter. When the issue is
simply the interpretation of legislation, the Court will look to statements by legislators for
guidance as to the purpose of the legislature, because the benefit to sound decision-making in
this circumstance is thought sufficient to risk the possibility of misreading Congress' purpose. It
is entirely a different matter when we are asked to void a statute that is, under well-settled
criteria, constitutional on its face, on the basis of what fewer than a handful of Congressmen
said about it. What motivates one legislator to make a speech about a statute is not necessarily
what motivates scores of others to enact it, and the stakes are sufficiently high for us to eschew
guesswork.
United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 383-84 (1968) (emphasis added) (footnote omitted)
(refusing to invalidate law prohibiting burning of draft cards even though some legislators expressed
intent to suppress speech). But see John Hart Ely, Legislative and Administrative Motivation in
Constitutional Law, 79 Yale L.J. 1205, 1212-17, 1275-81 (1970) (questioning O'Brien's rejection
of motive analysis).
As observed in the context of statutory interpretation, the so-called intent of a legislative body is
inherently difficult to establish. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L.
Rev. 621 (1990) (analyzing Justice Scalia's plain meaning interpretation of statutes, which eschews
any effort to discern Congressional intent and focuses almost exclusively on statutory language);
Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law, 1989 Duke L.J. 511,
517 (contending that "quest for . . . legislative intent is probably a wild-goose chase [because]
Congress [probably] didn't think about the matter at all").
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exponentially greater when the electorate of thousands, perhaps hundreds
of thousands, or maybe millions, of voters made an allegedly
discriminatory decision.'69 Even if a significant portion of the electorate
voted for the challenged measure for invidious reasons, it is close to
impossible to establish the true intent of such a diffuse decisionmaking
body.
In light of the difficulties encountered in establishing a single,
dominant, or primary intent of the lawmaking body, the Supreme Court
has stated that a person need only establish "that a discriminatory
purpose has been a motivating factor in the decision."' 70 Assuming that
this standard may work well in some contexts,171 it does not in evaluating
decisions of the electorate. Voters as a whole do not state the factors that
motivate their vote, but only whether a majority supports a measure or
candidate. Voter pamphlets and campaign advertisements are imperfect
indicators of illicit motive. 72 Moreover, it is nearly impossible to
determine how significant a "motivating factor" the invidious animus
need be before the law is invalidated. If race was a "motivating factor" to
one percent of the electorate, would that be sufficient? What about 20%?
The barriers to determining the collective intent of the electorate are
heightened by the fact that invidious discrimination is not always
conscious, but may operate at an unconscious level.173 When unconscious
racism influences a voting decision, voters (or legislators, for that matter)
are by definition unaware that they are acting in a discriminatory way.
Perhaps in recognition of such problems, lower courts have avoided
inquiry into the electorate's intent. To do so, they emphasize the sanctity
of the secret ballot and have been reluctant to invalidate an initiative
169. See Statement of Vote, supra note 18, at 115 (providing statistical breakdown showing that
over 8.5 million votes were cast on Proposition 187).
170. Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265-66
(1977) (emphasis added).
171. It is doubtful whether the "motivating factor" analysis might ever be literally applied
because, if it were, the test would lead to instant invalidation of almost any governmental decision. A
voter, for example, could vote for or against any political candidate for racist reasons. A vote for
Ronald Reagan over Walter Mondale in 1984 or George Bush over Michael Dukakis in 1988 could
have been motivated by a racist intent. The same could be said, for that matter, with respect to a vote
for California Governor Pete Wilson in the November 1994 election in which Proposition 187
prevailed. Of course, most probably are not willing to consider invalidation of any of these elections.
This is supported by the Court's decision in Arlington Heights, in which at least some of the votes
for the zoning decision must have been motivated by issues of race. See supra note 162 (describing
context of case).
172. See Eule, supra note 16, at 1562 n.264; Daniel Hays Lowenstein, California Initiatives and
the Single-Subject Rule, 30 UCLA L. Rev. 936,954 n.73 (1983).
173. See generally Lawrence, supra note 163.
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even if at least part of the electorate appeared to hav, a discriminatory
purpose in voting for the law. ' 4 Such an approach makes the invalidation
of an initiative appear possible only if the measure is discriminatory on
its face.
The end result is that, in the initiative process, voters may more-or-
less freely rely on invidious motives in supporting measures that have a
disproportionate impact on discrete and insular minorities. Individual
voters are much less likely than lawmakers and policymakers to be held
accountable-politically or judicially-for discriminatory decisions.
Although history teaches that legislatures are far from immune from
passing laws that discriminate, the intent of legislators is far easier
analyzed than that of the electorate. Moreover, because basing a law on
blatantly racist motives generally is not fashionable or legally
permissible, representative bodies, at least at some level, tend to
moderate discriminatory sentiment, a characteristic consistent with the
174. See, e.g., Clarke v. City of Cincirmati, 40 F.3d 807, 815 (6th Cir. 1994) (refusing to inquire
into electorate's intent in adopting electoral scheme for city council that had resulted in election of
few African-Americans over lengthy period); Arthur v. City of Toledo, 782 F.2d 565, 574 (6th Cir.
1986) ("We hold that absent a referendum that facially discriminates racially, or one where although
facially neutral, the only possible rationale is racially motivated, a district court cannot inquire into
the electorate's motivations in an equal protection clause context."); Kirksey v. City of Jackson, 663
F.2d 659, 662 (5th Cir. 1981) (agreeing that "inquiry 'into the motives of voters may very well
constitute an unwarranted and unconstitutional undermining of one of the most fundamental rights of
the citizens under our constitutional form of government") (citation omitted); see also Sager, supra
note 8, at 1421 (contending that "it is highly questionable whether it isl appropriate to examine
motivation in the electoral process" because voting is "an intentionally opaque, impenetrable
mechanism which aggregates personal preferences without regard to their nature or origin"). But see
United States v. City of Birmingham, 538 F. Supp. 819, 828 (E.D. Mich. '1982) (rejecting this view
and refusing "to permit cities to practice racial discrimination with impunity by the simple expedient
of adopting all discriminatory policies by popular vote"), modified, 727 F.2d 560 (6th Cir. 1984)
(reserving question whether court could inquire into electorate's intent).
Congress, responding to the Supreme Court's holding that a showing cf discriminatory intent is
necessary to prevail on an equal protection challenge to an electoral scheme adopted by the voters,
see City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55 (1980), passed the Voting Rights Act Amendments of
1982, Pub. L. No. 97-205, 96 Stat. 131 (1982). These amendments allow a finding that an electoral
scheme violates the statute absent a showing of discriminatory intent, and authorize a court to
consider the impact of the electoral scheme on minority reprsentatior. In so doing, Congress
expressly recognized the difficulties of etablishing the motive of the alectorate in adopting or
maintaining an electoral scheme. See S. Rep. No. 417,97th Cong., 2d Sess. 36-37 (1982), reprinted
in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 177, 214-15. Even if permitted to establish intent through circumstantial
evidence:
defendants can attempt to rebut that... evidence by planting a false trail of direct evidence in
the form of official resolutions, sponsorship statements and other legislative history eschewing
any racial motive, and advancing other governmental objectives.... ETihat danger ... seriously
clouds the prospects of eradicating the remaining instances of racial discrimination in American
elections.
Id. at 215.
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framers' hope for representative government. 75 Perhaps this in part
explains why the potentially explosive issues of race and class are more
likely to be addressed by the electorate than by legislative bodies. 76
The Supreme Court has been less than consistent in the application of
the intent requirement to the laws enacted by a plebiscite.1 77 On the one
hand, the Court has stated unequivocally that:
It is plain that the electorate as a whole, whether by referendum or
otherwise, could not order . . . action violative of the Equal
Protection Clause . . . and [government] may not avoid the
strictures of that Clause by deferring to the wishes or objections of
some fraction of the body politic. "Private biases may be outside
175. See Magleby, supra note 7, at 184-85; Bell, supra note 16, at 13-14; Eule, supra note 16, at
1531-33; Linde, supra note 68, at 169. But see Gillette, supra note 16 (arguing that the differences
between plebiscites and legislative bodies are grossly exaggerated); Baker, supra note 16 (making
similar contention from public choice perspective). In Madison's words, representative government:
refine[s] and enlarge[s] the public views, by passing them through the medium of a chosen body
of citizens, whose wisdom may best discern the tre interest of their country, and whose
patriotism and love of justice, will be least likely to sacrifice it to temporary or partial
considerations.... [It may well happen that the public voice pronounced by the representatives
of the people, will be more consonant to the public good, than if pronounced by the people
themselves....
The Federalist No. 10, supra note 65, at 62 (Madison) (emphasis added).
176. See Eule, People's Choice, supra note 73, at 787. In California, for example, a campaign is
gearing up to place an initiative on the ballot that would dismantle affirmative action in the state. See
Steven A. Holmes, Backlash Against Affirmative Action Troubles Advocates, N.Y. Times, Feb. 7,
1995, at B9.
177. Compare Washington v. Seattle Sch. Dist., 458 U.S. 457 (1982) (invalidating Washington
initiative prohibiting school board from requiring student from attending any school other than one
in neighborhood, except for broad exceptions not relating to racial considerations) with Crawford v.
Board of Educ., 458 U.S. 527 (1982) (upholding California proposition that barred state courts from
ordering bussing to desegregate schools unless a federal court would be permitted to do so). See Cass
R. Sunstein, Public Values, Private Interests, and the Equal Protection Clause, 1982 Sup. Ct. Rev.
123, 155 (observing that "[ilt is difficult to believe that Crawford was decided by the same court as
Seattle, much less that it was decided during the same Term and on the same day"); The Supreme
Court, 1981 Term, 96 Harv. L. Rev. 4, 121 (1982) (contending that Court in Seattle and Crawford
"failed to explain cogently why [Hunter v. Erickson] condemned the Washington initiative but not
the California referendum!). The Court distinguished the Washington initiative on the ground that it
placed special burdens on minorities in the political process, see Seattle, 458 U.S. at 467-70, while
the California one did not, see Crawford, 458 U.S. at 540-42. In making that distinction, both cases
relied upon Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385 (1969), which invalidated a municipal ballot initiative
providing that any regulation of real property transactions on the basis of race, color, religion,
national origin, or ancestry, but not others, be approved by a majority of voters. See Tribe, supra
note 36, § 16-17, at 1485-88; Eule, supra note 16, at 1562-68.
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the reach of the law, but the law cannot, directly or indirectly, give
them effect."1
78
On the other hand, the Court has demonstrated great reluctance to strike
down popularly-enacted laws on equal protection grounds. 1
79
In sum, the initiative process may permit the adoption by a politically
unaccountable electorate of laws with a discriminatory impact-an
action that a legislative body would be less likely to take. Such a
discriminatory decision is less likely to be successfully challenged on
equal protection grounds than that of an elected body. This dynamic,
which in effect encourages the passage of discriminatory laws with
minimal judicial oversight, is curious in light of the framers' deep
suspicion of popular democracy, which led to their placing primary
federal lawmaking authority in the hands of elected representatives.8"
Despite the fact that our constitutional scheme as a structural matter
reflects greater trust for lawmaldng by legislatures than by electorates, it
is more difficult as a constitutional matter to challenge the adoption of a
law by the voters on equal protection grounds.181 This lends credence to
the claim that lawmaking by initiative, which in certain circumstances
may be immune from meaningful judicial review, is inconsistent with the
representative form of government envisioned by the framers of the
Constitution.
This analysis further suggests that an equal protection challenge to
Proposition 187 based on a claim that it was adopted fur a discriminatory
purpose is problematic. This is true despite the troubling racist
undertones to the campaign, the fact that the initiative appeared directed
at undocumented Mexicans, and the fact that conscious and unconscious
racism influenced support for the initiative.
An argument could be made that the animus toward Mexicans was a
"motivating factor" behind the passage of the initiative. 82 The fact that
economic motives also might have been relied upon by those voting for
178. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432,448 (1985) (quoting Palmore v.
Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 433 (1984) (citation omitted); see Lucas v. Forty-Fourth Gen. Assembly, 377
U.S. 713, 736-37 (1964).
179. See supra cases cited in note 14.
180. See supra text accompanying notes 61-74.
181. See Sager, supra note 8, at 1411-18 (arguing that traditional constitutional arguments for
deference to judgments of governmental bodies fail to apply with equal force to legislation by
initiative).
182. See United States v. Yonkers Bd. of Educ., 837 F.2d 1181, 1223--24 (2d Cir. 1987); United
States v. Borough of Audubon, 797 F. $upp. 353, 361 (D.NJ. 1991); People Helpers, Inc. v. City of
Richmond, 789 F. Supp. 725,732 (E.D. Va. 1992).
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Proposition 187 is not in and of itself sufficient to immunize from
scrutiny the electorate's decision to adopt the measure." 3 However,
Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development
Corp., s which found that race was not a "motivating factor" in the
decision to bar development of racially and economically integrated
housing, illustrates that there are formidable barriers to invalidating
Proposition 187 as racially discriminatory based on this sort of argument.
Similarly, in upholding an initiative designed to limit busing as a remedy
to desegregation, the Supreme Court emphasized that:
the Proposition was approved by an overwhelming majority of the
electorate. It received support from members of all races. The
purposes of the Proposition are stated in its text and are legitimate,
nondiscriminatory objectives. In these circumstances, we will not
... impugn the motives of the State's electorate." 5
The application of a similar analysis to Proposition 187 would almost
certainly ensure its survival in the face of an equal protection challenge
based on race. Nonetheless, it would avoid the reality of the political
dynamic leading to the initiative's passage.
2. Alienage Classifications as a Proxy for National Origin
Discrimination
Although racial classifications are afforded heightened constitutional
scrutiny under traditional equal protection analysis," 6 that is not always
the case with respect to alienage classifications.8 7 As demonstrated by
183. See Ion C. Dubin, From Junkyards to Gentrification: Explicating a Right to Protective Zoning
in Low-Income Communities of Color, 77 Minn. L. Rev. 739, 792-93 (1993) (summarizing land-use
case law to effect that "conduct motivated by seemingly neutral financial goals such as preserving
property values, enhancing the municipal tax base, or maximizing profit can include elements of
invidious intent. Additionally, evidence showing that governmental planning practices were designed to
create the image that persons of color are unwelcome supports a finding of discriminatory intent')
(footnotes omitted); see also supra text accompanying notes 64-66 (articulating Madison's concerns
with influence of majority's self-interest in direct democracy).
184. 429 U.S. 252, 265-66 (1977); see also supra text accompanying notes 170-71 (quoting
"motivating factor" language and analyzing this requirement of Arlington Heights).
185. Crawford v. Board of Educ., 458 U.S. 527, 545 (1982) (footnotes omitted). But see
Washington v. Seattle Sch. Dist., 458 U.S. 457, 471 (1982) (rejecting contention that initiative was
valid because "there is little doubt that the initiative was effectively drawn for racial purposes.
Neither the initiative's sponsors, nor the District Court, nor the Court of Appeals had any difficulty
perceiving the racial nature of the issue settled by Initiative 350.).
186. See generally Tribe, supra note 36, § 16-14.
187. Compare Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971) (applying strict scrutiny to alienage
classification in state welfare scheme) with Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 84-87 (1976) (deferring
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the alien land laws,'88 alienage classifications, though presumptively
lawful, may veil an invidious purpose to discriminate, which would
presumptively be invalid."8 9 This, however, would be; very difficult to
prove.
The formidable evidentiary burdens may force courts facing this type
of case to attempt to achieve a result consistent with equality principles
through means other than the Equal Protection Clause. For example, in
Yniguez v. Arizonans for Official English,' the Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit invalidated on First Amendment grounds an initiative
amending the Arizona constitution to compel state employees and
officials to speak only English in the workplace. After finding that the
initiative violated the First Amendment, the court buttressed its reasoning
by emphasizing the equal protection consequences of the law: "Since
language is a close and meaningful proxy for national origin, restrictions
to congressional use of alienage classification in federal medical benefits program). See Tribe, supra
note 36, § 16-23; see also supra text accompanying note 159 (mentionirg non-suspect nature of
alienage classifications under federal law). It has been argued that, except when alienage
classifications in state laws are used to discriminate on the basis of race or some other impermissible
ground, they should not be evaluated under the equal protection clause but on federal supremacy
terms. See Michael J. Perry, Modern Equal Protection: A Conceptualization and Appraisal, 79
Colum. L. Rev. 1023, 1060-65 (1979); David F. Levi, Note, The Equal Treatment of Aliens:
Preemption or Equal Protection?, 31 Stan. L. Rev. 1069 (1979).
188. See supra text accompanying notes 91-100.
189. See Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886). But cf Narenji v. Civiletti, 617 F.2d 745
(D.C. Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 957 (1980) (refusing to invalidate on equal protection
grounds regulation that imposed reporting and other requirements on Iranian students during time of
tense U.S.-Iran relations). Though it is impermissible to discriminate on the basis of ethnicity or
national origin of noncitizens in the country, the Supreme Court has not overruled precedent over a
century old permitting the federal government to discriminate on the basis of race and national origin
with respect to the admission of aliens into the country. See Chae Chan Ping v. United States (the
Chinese Exclusion Case), 130 U.S. 581 (1889). But cf. Jean v. Nelson, 472 U.S. 846 (1985)
(avoiding decision on vitality of Chinese Exclusion Case by finding that applicable statute and
regulations did not permit discrimination on basis of race or national origin). In challenging this
proposition, Gerald Rosberg focuses on the damage to citizens sharing the race or national origin of
the excluded groups:
[S]uch a classification would also require strict scrutiny, not because of the injury to the aliens
denied admission, but rather because of the injury to American citizens of the same race or
national origin who are stigmatized by the classification. When Congress, declares that aliens of
Chinese or Irish or Polish origin are excludable on the grounds of ancestry alone, it fixes a
badge of opprobrium on citizens of the same ancestry... Except wher necessary to protect a
compelling interest, Congress cannot implement a policy that has the offect of labeling some
group of citizens as inferior to others because of their race or national orilin.
Gerald M. Rosberg, The Protection of Aliens from Discriminatory Treatment by the National
Government, 1977 Sup. Ct. Rev. 275, 327.
190. 42 F.3d 1217 (9th Cir. 1994) (Reinhardt, J.), petition for reh'g en banc granted, 53 F.3d
1084 (9th Cir 1995); see supra text accompanying notes 87-90 (descriling briefly English-Only
laws enacted through initiative).
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on the use of languages may mask discrimination against specific
national origin groups or, more generally, conceal nativist sentiment."' 91
This statement seems uncontroversial in isolation. However, it is
peculiar that the court invalidated the English-Only initiative on First
Amendment" 2 rather than equal protection grounds. In light of modem
equal protection law's intent requirement, the burden of proving that the
Arizona electorate employed language as a proxy for national origin was
extremely great. 93 This helps explain why, despite the initiative's impact
on certain national origin groups, the court in Yniguez shied away from
deciding the case on equal protection grounds.'94
Like national origin and language, a link exists in the United States
between national origin and immigration status. With increasing
immigration from developing nations in recent years, the link has
become more pronounced. 9 A problem for the future will be
determining when facially neutral laws concerning immigration and
191. Yniguez, 42 F.3d at 1241-42 (citations & footnote omitted); see also Garcia v. Spun Steak
Co., 998 F.2d 1480, 1486 (9th Cir. 1993) ("It is beyond dispute that, in this case, if the English-Only
policy [of an employer in the workplace, which was found not to violate Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act] causes any adverse effects, those effects will be suffered disproportionately by those of
Hispanic origin. The vast majority of those workers at Spun Steak who speak a language other than
English-and virtually all those employees for whom English is not a first language-are
Hispanic.'), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 2726 (1994); Gutierrez v. Municipal Court, 838 F.2d 1031, 1040
(9th Cir. 1988) ("We agree that English-Only rules generally have an adverse impact on protected
groups and that they should be closely scrutinized. We also agree that such rules can 'create an
atmosphere of inferiority, isolation, and intimidation.' Finally, we agree that such rules can readily
mask an intent to discriminate on the basis of national origin:) (citations omitted), vacated, 490 U.S.
1016 (1989). See generally Perea, supra note 88 (analyzing linkage between language and national
origin and discrimination against national origin minorities through language restrictions).
192. The First Amendment analysis is not without potential flaws. See Eule, supra note 16, at
1567 n.289 (referring to "imaginative" reasoning by district court in Yniguez in invalidating initiative
on First Amendment grounds).
193. See supra text accompanying notes 162-85 (analyzing intent requirement). In Herandez v.
New York, 500 U.S. 352 (1991), for example, the Supreme Court rejected the claim that the use of
peremptory challenges to strike Spanish-speakers by a prosecutor prosecuting a Latino defendant
violated the equal protection clause because it masked discrimination on the basis of national origin.
See, e.g., Pemberthy v. Beyer, 19 F.3d 857, 872 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 439 (1994)
(emphasizing that, although "language-speaking ability is ... closely correlated with ethnicity,"
court was "not willing to hold as a matter of law that language-based classifications are always a
proxy for race or ethnicity"); United States v. Munoz, 15 F.3d 395, 399 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 114
S. Ct. 2149 (1994) (holding to same effect); see also United States v. Canoy, 38 F.3d 893, 898 (7th
Cir. 1994) (refusing to reverse criminal conviction following use of peremptory challenge to excuse
potential Asian-American alternate juror and accepting government's "facially-neutral explanation"
that he "had been educated outside the United States and entirely in a foreign language [and] the
government was concerned with whether English was [his] first language") (citation omitted).
194. See Eule, supra note 16, at 1567-68.
195. See supra text accompanying note 44.
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immigrants, such as reduction of benefits to lawful pemanent residents,
mask an invidious discrimination against certain national origin groups.
Despite the recurring nature of the problem, the link between national
origin and immigration status, and the analytical difficulties it creates for
traditional equal protection analysis, for the most part have gone ignored.
III. THE LEGACY OF PROPOSITION 187
Proposition 187 is the product of a deeply complex, perhaps unique,
set of political forces in the United States. As the solid support for the
measure amply demonstrates, its backing did not split along classic
liberal-conservative lines. The limited political power of noncitizens
made it easier for one powerful politician to use Proposition 187 and
anti-immigrant/anti-immigration sentiment to build a bipartisan coalition,
ensuring his re-election and the initiative's passage.
The next stage in the life of Proposition 187 will be determined by the
courts. Within days of the initiative's passage, immignmt advocates filed
numerous lawsuits challenging the lawfulness of the initiative. 96 The
challenges in those lawsuits run the gamut from violation of the federal
Constitution and statutes to claims that the initiative violates the
California constitution. Curiously enough, a much-debated aspect of the
passage of Proposition 187-that it is nativistic and racist-in all
probability will never be decided by the courts. Such contentions will in
all likelihood be lost in legalisms.'97 Thus, although a particularly
damning claim in U.S. legal culture, and one of critical importance to the
affected communities, the charge will go untested and unresolved.
Even without deciding the claims of invidious discrimination, the
courts, possibly even the Supreme Court, will face a monumental task in
196. See, e.g., League of United Latin American Citizens v. Wilson, Complaint for Injunctive and
Declaratory Relief [Class Action], Case No. 94-7569 MRP(JRx) (C.D. Cal., filed Nov. 9, 1994);
Gregoio T. v. Wilson, Civil Rights Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief [Class Action]
Case No. 94-7652 (C.D. Cal. filed Nov. 10, 1994); Pedro A. v. Dawon, Petition for Writ of
Mandate and Complaint for Injunctive and Declaratory Relief, Case No. 965089 (Cal. Super. Ct,
City and County of San Francisco, filed Nov. 9, 1994). A preliminary injunction was entered
prohibiting enforcement of most of the provisions of Proposition 187. See Gregorio T. v. Wilson,
1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 17044 (9th Cir. July 5, 1995).
197. Some of the complaints challenging the lawfulness of Proposition 187 make unspecified
equal protection claims, see, e.g., League of United Latin American Citizens v. Wilson, Complaint
for Injunction and Declaratory Relief [Class Action], Case No. 94-7569 VIRP(JRx) Third, Fourth,
and Fifth Causes of Action, IN 53-58 (C.D. Cal., filed Nov. 9, 1994), or appear to be based on the
alienage status of the persons affected, see, e.g., Gregorio T. v. Wilson, Civil Rights Complaint for
Declaratory and Injunctive Relief [Class Action] 50, Case No. 94-7652 (C.D. Cal., filed Nov. 10,
1994) (alleging that exclusion of children from public elementary and secondary schools violates
Equal Protection Clause).
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reviewing the California electorate's attempt at immigration
policymaking. Popular democracy has a deep hold on the nation's
collective consciousness, though it was not nearly as revered by the
framers of the Constitution. A court reviewing the emphatic statement of
the electorate, particularly without unimpeachable legal principles
mandating invalidation, at a bare minimum can be expected to take a
long and deep breath before invalidating the law. 9
There are many explanations why courts will avoid even asking, much
less deciding, whether race, color, and ethnicity impermissibly motivated
Proposition 187's passage. The heavy burden of proving the
discriminatory intent of a diffuse electorate with almost as many
motivations as there are voters makes an equal protection claim based on
race especially problematic. 99 Doctrinal uncertainty concerning alienage
classifications and the frequent link between alienage status and race,
ethnicity, and color, further complicate matters.
How the lawsuits will play out is difficult to predict. What we do
know is that Proposition 187 touches on issues going to the core of
national identity-issues that this nation will be grappling with well into
the twenty-first century. Proposition 187 may simply mark the
beginning.
198. See, e.g., Legislature of California v. Eu, 816 P.2d 1309, 1313 (Cal. 1991) ("Mhe initiative
power must be liberally construed to promote the democratic process.... [S]uch measures must be
upheld unless their unconstitutionality clearly, positively, and unmistakably appears.") (citations
omitted) (emphasis in original omitted). But cf U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 115 S. Ct. 1842
(1995) (invalidating voter-imposed term limits on Arkansas' representatives to Congress). This is
particularly true for the more politically accountable state courts. See Joseph R. Grodin, In Pursuit of
Justice: Reflections of a State Supreme Court Justice 105-06 (1989) (stating that political
accountability of California Supreme Court justices may inhibit them from invalidating initiative
passed by electorate). There is evidence supporting the concern for political retribution by the
electorate. In 1966, after striking down an initiative permitting racial discrimination in home sales,
see Mulkey v. Reitman, 413 P.2d 825 (Cal. 1966), aff'd sub nom., 387 U.S. 369 (1967), the
confirmation majorities of the California Supreme Court justices dropped over twenty percentage
points from the high in the previous election. See Stephen R. Barnett, California Justice, 78 Cal. L.
Rev. 247, 259 (1990) (book review). The refusal of the electorate in 1986 to confirm three California
Supreme Court justices, including Chief Justice Rose Bird, may be attributable in part to the court's
willingness to invalidate initiatives. See Eule, supra note 16, at 1581-82.
199. See supra text accompanying notes 155-85.

